



**European Initiative for Agricultural Research for Development**  
**Analysis of donor support to CAADP Pillar 4 - Phase 2**

**A report to**  
**Executive Secretary, EIARD, European Commission, Brussels**

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## Executive Summary

S 1. NEPAD's Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme aims to improve food security and incomes in Africa by raising public investment in agriculture to 10% of budgets and stimulating agricultural growth of 6% per annum. CAADP has four pillars: 1. Land and Water Management; 2. Market Access; 3. Food Supply and Hunger; and 4. Agricultural Research and Technology Dissemination. The programme helps individual African countries to develop a Country Compact, committing Government and the country's development partners to a common strategy for agricultural development.

S 2. EIARD has commissioned this 'Analysis of Donor Support to CAADP Pillar 4' to:

*To provide EIARD with the knowledge and processes required to better coordinate and harmonise support to CAADP Pillar 4 both between EIARD members, and between EIARD members and other donors.*

The Study has two phases. The first phase provided an overall mapping of donor support to CAADP Pillar 4, mainly at the continental and sub-regional levels, together with an initial assessment of how far that support meets the Paris Declaration requirements for aid effectiveness. The final report for Phase 1 was submitted in March 2011.

S 3. This report is for Phase 2, in which three countries were taken as case studies: Benin, Tanzania and Zambia. There were five tasks: i) a qualitative assessment of the CAADP process; ii) mapping donor support to CAADP Pillar 4 in each country; iii) identification of areas where that support shows high 'aid effectiveness' and areas where effectiveness is potentially low; iv) analysis of the factors behind high and low effectiveness; and v) identification of opportunities to improve donor support to CAADP Pillar 4.

S 4. Some of the Study's findings are challenging. This is in keeping with the ambitious objective set out above. However, it is important to note the Study's limitations very clearly. With a small budget and staff time allocation, it comprised a desk-review of available literature and data on websites, supported by a short email questionnaire and telephone discussions with stakeholders. The data reviewed has significant gaps and weaknesses and the response to the questionnaire was disappointing. Inevitably, the secondary material is somewhat out of date. After careful consideration, the Study Team believes it will make a more useful contribution to EIARD discussions if the findings are presented as they stand, but subject to correction when better data becomes available. If it only succeeds in encouraging the production of that better data, it will have served one useful purpose. (For quick reference to the supporting material, key passages in the main report are noted in this summary.)

### The CAADP Process and Architecture

S 5. The in-country CAADP process starts with a period of stocktaking and analysis, which provides the basis for the Country Compact. This leads on to the preparation of an Agriculture Investment Plan and agreements to implement that plan. A Post Compact Road Map sets out how capacities and resource requirements for implementation will be assessed, resources will be mobilised and implementation will be monitored.

S 6. To support this process, a complex architecture has developed. Apart from the CAADP Secretariat within NEPAD, it involves the three Regional Economic Councils, four Pillar Lead Institutions, and three or more Sub-Regional Organisations working with each of the Pillar Leads. These organisations are funded through a CAADP MDTF, sub-divided into 'Child' funds. Most of them also have funding from other pooled funds and bilateral donors. In theory, it is possible that agriculture institutions in a given country might have to deal with, and be supported by 10 different organisations, all under the CAADP mandate. At the global level, the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development acts as convener of twice-yearly CAADP Partnership Platform meetings. (See Section 2.1)



S 7. FAO and IFPRI are providing technical support to the process. IFPRI manages a Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System, as a data and resource centre for CAADP as a whole. For Pillar 4, another resource is particularly relevant, the Agriculture Science and Technology Indicators data centre, also managed by IFPRI. IFPRI's modelling of the agricultural growth rate needed to meet the MDG on poverty reduction, and the level of public investment needed to achieve that growth, has influenced many of the CAADP agricultural investment plans.

S 8. Independently of CAADP, and before it got underway, donors had established coordination arrangements in most countries. These include some form of Agriculture Sector Working Group and agreed procedures for working with Government, commonly as a 'joint assistance strategy'. (See Sections 2.2.4 and 5.1)

S 9. CAADP is not a funding organisation and, despite its name, it acts as an enabling 'framework' rather than as a programme. Its objective is to persuade Governments to commit 10% of national budgets to agriculture, and to assist them to develop appropriate investment and support programmes, and find donors to support those programmes. The new Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme is expected to be an important source of funding. However, only five of the 12 countries funded by the GAFSP so far come from Sub Saharan Africa.

S 10. Two 2009 reviews of CAADP made similar findings. CAADP had been a '*strong instrument*' for winning commitment to agriculture at global and continental levels. It had developed tools and resources to support work at the country level. Three of the four Pillar Lead Institutions were having an impact, including FARA for Pillar 4. At the country level, however, CAADP had been weak and it was '*not meeting expectations*.' In some countries it had been seen as duplicating work that had already been done, and it had not significantly built capacity or improved the quality of analysis. There had been little impact on national policies and strategies. The post Compact period was seen as a particular weakness: without a medium-term vision or analysis of how greater investment in agriculture could be effectively absorbed. Despite CAADP having strengthened Government capacities to engage with donors on agriculture, national ownership was found to be weak. In summary, CAADP had the potential to strengthen agricultural development processes at the country level but it had yet to realise it. To do this would take more effort in-country. It might be better to focus on a limited number of countries, if it would make this possible. (Section 2.2)

S 11. In a strong sign of its wish to learn and improve its processes, one of these reviews was carried out by CAADP itself and programme guidelines have been revised as a result. Unfortunately, there are no later reviews to assess the impact of these changes.

### **The Study Questionnaire**

S 12. There was a poor response to the Study Questionnaire. Overall, respondents rated CAADP well on Ownership and rather less well on Alignment and Harmonisation. Funding procedures and conditionalities under the various MDTFs were cited as a weakness under all three headings. Lack of capacity in National Agricultural Research Systems is a barrier to ownership. There were fewest responses to a question about the quality of support given to the CAADP process. However, those few responses were less positive. (Sections 2.3 and 4.)

### **The Country Case Studies**

S 13. The three case study countries are widely dispersed. By per capita incomes they are quite different. At \$960, Zambia per capita GNI is 28% higher than Benin's, and nearly double that of Tanzania. With respect to agricultural development, they are more similar, especially Benin and Tanzania. In these two countries, agriculture contributes some 30% of GDP, and the sector has been growing at around 5% per annum for quite long periods. In Zambia, agriculture is 22% of GDP, but sector growth has been below 1% for most of the 2000s, with a number of years of negative growth.

S 14. Similarities between the countries are greater, when it comes to CAADP and donor support to ARD. Public spending on agriculture has been over 6% of the budget in all three countries. With declines in 2008, there was no sign up to that point of an increase towards the CAADP target of 10%. Spending on ARD is well below 1% of agricultural GDP, a target which it has been suggested is too



low anyway. ARD capacities are also low. Benin has only 115 researchers: equivalent to 71 researchers per million farmers. Tanzania has 670 researchers, but that is only 40 per million farmers. (Section 3, Table 2)

### **The CAADP Process**

S 15. All three countries have signed their Country Compact, but only Benin has a full investment plan. Tanzania's is under preparation. For Zambia there is little CAADP-related material available. At 10 pages, the Compacts follow a similar model. With no specific commitments beyond CAADP's 10% investment: 6% growth targets, they are essentially statements of principle and an agreement to work together. With one exception, analytical material prepared for the stocktaking and the investment plans is also quite general. (Section 3.2.3 reviews the Tanzania example.) The exception concerns econometric models prepared by ReSAKSS/IFPRI to estimate the levels of investment and agricultural growth needed to meet the MDG goal for poverty reduction. These are sophisticated and detailed models. However, the underlying assumptions are relatively standard and by no means certain; especially those relating to the probable return from increased public spending on agriculture. The model results indicate a need for agricultural growth of 7% or even as high as 11%, continuously for the period to 2015. On that basis, it is estimated that public spending on agriculture will need to increase by as much as 27% per annum. These targets seem unlikely to be achievable. (Sections 2.4, 3.1.1, 3.2.1, and 3.3.1)

S 16. CAADP is working within a set of donor coordination arrangements and agricultural development plans which were set up before the (CAADP) Roundtable Process began:

- There are Agricultural Sector Working Groups in all three countries. Tanzania and Zambia have formal Joint Assistance Strategies.
- Agricultural planning is integrated into wider national plans: Poverty Reduction Strategies; National Development Plans; etc. These were prepared through consultation and participatory planning.
- In Tanzania, as the clearest example, a comprehensive Agriculture Sector Development Plan and associated donor basket-fund provide the framework for a Sector Wide Approach. The plan was drafted well before the CAADP process started in Tanzania and it will not end until 2013.

CAADP came into effect rather late and it has had limited resources. In Tanzania, for example, stocktaking was completed in barely six months before the Compact was signed. The result is that CAADP has found it difficult to add value to processes which were well underway. In the worst case, it has been seen as duplicating work that had already been done. (Sections 2.3, and 3.2.3)

S 17. There are still many issues over coordination, harmonisation and alignment. A substantial proportion of donor funds are spent outside the agreed coordination and alignment frameworks. The Study did not find evidence that the CAADP process has done much to improve things. There is even a risk that it has created an impression of progress, and so allowed underlying issues to be ignored. By introducing a number of new regional and continental actors – NEPAD, the RECs, etc – CAADP has significantly increased the number of organisations which national agricultural stakeholders must deal with. In effect it has added a third dimension to what was a two-way dialogue between Government and donors in-country. It is not clear what this has contributed to the agricultural development process. (Sections 2.3, and 2.4)

### **Support to ARD**

S 18. During the 1990s and early 2000s, each of the three countries benefited from major programmes to reform the National Agricultural Research System. A relatively standard model promoted demand-led research by semi-autonomous, self-financing research institutes. These reforms were only partially successful and large-scale donor support has now been withdrawn. This has left most NARS institutes under-funded and under-staffed, as a result of recruitment freezes and poor



salaries. Imperfectly absorbed demand-led models have left a lack of strategic direction. (Sections 3.1.4, 3.2.4, 3.3.3 and 5.2.2)

S 19. The Study prepared a country-level mapping of donor funded ARD projects. The mapping is still very imperfect. There are known to be significant gaps and uncertainties about classification (Sections 3.1.5, 3.2.5 and 3.3.4). With that caveat, it shows:

- Each country has a large portfolio of donor –supported projects in which it participates, or is at least claimed as a beneficiary: 62 for Benin, 140 for Tanzania and 52 for Zambia.
- Up to half of the projects in each portfolio are coordinated by a CGIAR centre, with as many as 12 centres working in, or on projects intended to benefit, one country. (This confirms the Phase 1 Study finding that over half of donor support is channelled through CGIAR.) Most of these projects are multi-country, with several implementing partners. Given the average size of CGIAR projects recorded in Phase 1, it seems that the resources of an individual project are thinly spread.
- Sub-regional organisations also coordinate a large proportion of each country’s ARD portfolio: 21% in the case of Benin. With good funding and a regional mandate, project resources may be less thinly spread, but almost all of these projects are also multi-country, multi-implementer.
- Even for bilateral donors, multi-country projects are common. With the result that few projects are focussed on the individual country: 11% for Tanzania.
- National institutions are lead/coordinating implementers on a very small proportion: just one for Tanzania and two for Benin. A rather larger number are named as participating implementers: 39% of Tanzanian projects.
- A significant proportion of the portfolios seem to be international projects, which may potentially benefit the country but in which it has no participation.
- The portfolios are heavily oriented towards crop agriculture, followed by policy, climate change and NR management. Livestock is under-represented.
- National capacity to engage with these large portfolios must be quite limited. In Benin, for example, there are less than two full time researchers, of all grades and with their own work to do, for each project in the portfolio.

S 20. ARD systems in all three countries are structured around well-understood agro-ecological zones and farming systems. These national characteristics are not reflected in the donor-supported portfolio, which shows little sign of alignment with specific national needs. It is dominated by topics which are seen as relevant across whole regions: Insect Resistant Maize for Africa is a typical project title. The Benin and Tanzania agricultural strategies both emphasise mechanisation and labour productivity; probably correctly, given the relative abundance of land. (Sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.1) Yet the portfolio includes no work on mechanisation. Instead it is focussed on yield improving, land-saving technologies.

S 21. A large part of each country’s portfolio is financed through competitive grant funds. This has become the dominant funding model for donor support to ARD, whether it is at the global, the regional or the national level. It has been well known since the 1990s that the expected benefits of this model, in terms of higher quality, demand-led research, will only be realised if strong ARD capacity exists to bid for the funds. Capable, well-resourced fund managers are also essential, with the result that competitive funds also incur significant transactions costs. None of the three countries has a large body of capable research institutions with adequate core funding to provide a platform for their competitive bids. Competitive grand funding, and the regionalisation of funds, may have tended to create supply-driven competition in which international and regional providers are better able to compete than national organisations. (Section 5.2.4)



S 22. On the evidence available to this study, ARD in SSA has not benefited substantially from efforts to improve aid effectiveness on the Paris principles. At the national level, the move to sector wide/budget support coincided with the end of large programmes of NARS reform. The result may have been that ARD lost visibility and funding, at a time when the NARS was struggling to absorb those reforms. Internationally, CAADP and other initiatives have significantly expanded the constituency of international ARD providers and coordinators: CGIAR, FARA, SROs, AGRA, AATF, etc. An increasing proportion of donor support has been channelled through these intermediaries. However, these channels do not appear to have been strongly integrated into donor coordination structures at the country level. Some may be operating in parallel to those arrangements.

S 23. The Study team believe this may have led to significant imbalances in donor support to ARD. Research into global and regional public goods is now extremely well funded. National public goods such as demand-led, farming system-specific, adaptive research are underfunded. The second imbalance is between large budgets for competitive grant funds and limited core funding to national research institutions. This has led to a third imbalance, between national capacity and regional and international capacity. The lack of national capacity is, in its turn, a factor in a lack of ownership and poor alignment with national needs.

S 24. Much of donor support to ARD in the three countries reflects a common strategy: economic growth led by agriculture and agricultural growth led by yield-improving, land-saving technologies. Of the three countries at least one, Zambia, might do better with an alternative strategy. One in which agriculture is a lagging sector, which contributes to growth by reducing costs and raising labour productivity, not by increasing output. All three countries have the potential to benefit from land-extending technologies which raise labour productivity. Another critical strategic issue concerns the effectiveness of public sector spending on agriculture. The case study countries already have a strong base of policy research and analysis around these strategic issues. If CAADP is to make a useful contribution to these discussions, it will need to bring significantly greater technical and financial resources to the task.

### **Review of Phase 1 Findings**

S 25. The first phase of the Study made six principal findings:

- a. On available data, donor support to ARD in SSA was estimated at \$470 million per annum, of which the EU contributes 35%.
- b. Some 65% of the total goes through the CGIAR system. CGIAR reform will be critical to any improvements to the effectiveness of support to CAADP Pillar 4. However, CGIAR material makes little reference to CAADP.
- c. EU and other donors commonly refer to CAADP in statements of their ARD-related policies. Some have contributed substantially to the CAADP trust funds and process. Beyond that there is little evidence that donors see CAADP as a strategy to guide their operations, e.g. by mapping their support to the four Pillars.
- d. The Gates foundation was estimated to be the second largest donor to CGIAR programmes in Africa and the third largest to non-CGIAR ARD, mostly through intermediaries such as AGRA.
- e. With few exceptions, no donor support goes directly to the National ARD systems. These are now supported by budget support, supplemented by relatively small research grants through CGIAR and other intermediaries, with SROs such as ASARECA seeming to be the largest single source.
- f. Studies suggested Ownership by African stakeholders at continental and regional levels is strong. It is less so at the country level; where there is limited evidence of strong donor engagement in the central Country Compact process, and the details of the process are not reflected in donor policy statements.



S 26. Although there remain many problems with the data, these findings seem to be confirmed by the Phase 2 material, in particular the low level of support to National Agricultural Research Systems. However the case studies have also shown that it will be a demanding and complex task to integrate CAADP with existing policies, strategies and donor coordination arrangements at the country level. This gives more emphasis to the last of the Phase 1 findings, about the need for a strong donor engagement in the CAADP country process.

### **Opportunities for CAADP**

S 27. CAADP has great strengths. It has won unanimous support from international donors and built a strong African and sub-regional infrastructure for its work. For Ownership, Alignment and Harmonisation, CAADP is clearly right to focus on the country level. African nations have yet to take full ownership of the CAADP process, but they have acknowledged its legitimacy and the role it is playing. A willingness to critically review its own work and take steps to improve it is an important strength. For all these reasons, CAADP has the potential to make a great difference to agricultural development in Africa. The challenge is how to realise it. The Study identifies three broad opportunities to do this: one under Pillar 4, and two for the broader CAADP process.

#### **1. Coordination of Donor Support to ARD**

S 28. CAADP, and FARA, can work in three ways to enable a better balance of donor support to ARD:

- The balance between funding through international and regional agencies and national capacities could be improved by providing targeted support to the development of a national research strategy, as a component of the Agricultural Investment Plan. To avoid a ‘business-as-usual’ response, rigorous analysis and awareness of lessons from earlier attempts to reform ARD will be essential. Simplistic targets that research funding should be 1% or 1.5% of agricultural GDP will be unhelpful, if not counter-productive.
- CAADP should seek ways to engage in the current CGIAR reform process, with the specific brief of representing Africa’s National Agricultural Research Systems. However, this may not be easy to achieve. SSA has two representatives on the 22 member CGIAR Fund council, where GFAR is also a member. Otherwise neither CAADP, FARA nor any of the SROs, is represented at any level in the CGIAR structure. Added to this, the fund mandate emphasises “mutual accountability of those who conduct research and those who fund it.” There is no parallel accountability to the intended beneficiaries. It is suggested below that EIARD may have a role to play in helping CAADP make its voice heard in CGIAR discussions. CAADP can also work to put the issue of balance in levels and forms of support in front of the donors, through the Global Donor Platform, GCARD, EIARD and other fora. Through these channels, it may be possible to have an effective influence on the policies and strategies of CGIAR and other agencies.
- There would also be scope for a broader analysis of the issue of balance: between research into global and regional public goods and demand-led national research; and between competitive grant and core funding. This should include specific emphasis on national systems.

#### **2. Building Country Ownership**

S 29. As an African-led and African-owned initiative, CAADP is the natural vehicle for building ownership in the agriculture sector. That it has not had great impact to date is disappointing, but it is mainly because the effort that would be needed was underestimated. At present CAADP only has a small presence in a country, supported by short, intermittent technical missions; both mainly staffed by personnel from international organisations. A larger, more focussed and wholly CAADP effort would be needed, but the opportunity is clear. Such a unit would provide national stakeholders with a sounding board with which to discuss strategic issues and differences of opinion with donors. It would also facilitate policy research and specialist advice for national stakeholders, to help balance the technical forces in discussions with the donors.



### **3. The Post Compact Process**

S 30. CAADP seems to have underestimated the effort required post-Compact, and the complexity of the exercise. Agriculture Investment Plans must fit in with existing national plans and programmes, and be realistic in terms of national resources. Individual components must be demonstrably feasible and fundable. CAADP's opportunity is to commit the resources needed to do this. The need is demonstrated by the fact that relatively few African countries have so far won funding from the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme, the most like source of substantial new funding for African agriculture.

#### **Other Opportunities**

S 31. Significant efforts have been put into donor coordination at the international level. It is outside the scope of this Study, but the team would note an impression of fund proliferation and platform proliferation. There does not seem to be a strong link between this higher-level effort and donor coordination platforms in-country. As with CAADP and ARD, there is a question of balance between global coordination which is well-funded and in-country platforms which lack resources and continuity. If these impressions are correct, it would be worth investigating how to set a better balance.

S 32. Much more important than that, however, is the opportunity for donors and other international stakeholders to support CAADP in its effort to realise its full potential and, in parallel, hold both CAADP and themselves accountable for this. None of the reviews, and certainly not this Study, question the concept or the fact that CAADP's country focus is correct. Support to that focus would contribute directly to greater aid coordination, harmonisation and, above all, ownership.

S 33. The Study's best efforts have failed to develop an accurate mapping of donor support to ARD. There is an important opportunity to advance understanding of donor efforts to support agricultural research for development in Sub-Saharan Africa, if such a mapping could be created on a single, unified platform; and provided it is kept up to date with the support of at least a large majority of donors.

#### **Opportunities for EIARD**

S 34. As representative of a major, influential group of donors to ARD in Sub Saharan Africa, EIARD has an opportunity to play an important supporting role in a number of areas.

- Information: Phase 1 and Phase 2 of this Study have highlighted the poor quality of available data on donor support to ARD. EIARD is already scoping ways to address this.
- Partnership Programmes: EIARD donors allocate substantial resources to this. These could be coordinated and aligned behind an explicit CAADP programme to support national ARD capacities, as a key contribution to the suggested rebalancing of support towards the country level.
- Emerging Donors: The Gates Foundation and other new donors and agencies now provide an important share of donor support to ARD. Through their country representatives, EIARD members can work to bring these new actors into existing donor coordination efforts at the country level (ASWGs etc).
- CGIAR Reform: With four members, Europe has the largest group of donor representatives on the new CGIAR Fund Council. There is a clear opportunity for EIARD to support the voices of CAADP and SSA as whole at the highest level in the CGIAR system.





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2. Semi-structured Questionnaire for Key Informants in Benin and Zambia.
3. Semi-structured Questionnaire for Key Informants in Tanzania

#### Excel Spreadsheet – 3CountryARDPortfolio.xls

4. ARD Portfolios for Benin, Tanzania and Zambia



### Disclaimer

This report presents the views and judgement of the ‘Analysis of donor support to CAADP4’ Study team members. It does not represent those of EIARD or any other partner to the Study.

The findings and conclusions are based on an incomplete dataset of donor funding for ARD activities in SSA, a short desk review of available literature and responses from a small group of informants. The Study has sought to identify overall patterns. Levels of funding and other detail has been interpreted with caution. Readers should bear these limitations in mind when judging the report’s conclusions. Nevertheless, it is believed that its findings may make a useful contribution to the better coordination of donor assistance to ARD in Sub-Saharan Africa.

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- Julie Brayer, EEAS, Cotonou, Benin
- Francesca Di Mauro, Head of Economics Section, PSD and Rural Development, EEAS, Zambia
- Alan Whitworth, Economist, DFID, Zambia
- Anne-Claire Leon, 1<sup>st</sup> Secretary Natural Resources, EU Delegation, Tanzania
- Ana Margarida Mariguesa, Prog. Officer Agriculture/Food Security, EU Delegation, Tanzania

#### CGIAR/ World Bank

- Nienke Beintema, Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators (ASTI), IFPRI
- Dr Indira Ekanayake, Senior Agriculturist, World Bank, Zambia

**Acronyms**

AfDB	African Development Bank
AGRA	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
AgCPG	Agriculture (sector) Cooperating Partners Group (Zambia)
ARD	Agricultural Research for Development
ASARECA	Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa
ASTI	Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators
ASWG	Agriculture Sector Working Group or variants (e.g. Agriculture Donor Working Groups)
AU	African Union
BMGF	Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
CAADP	Comprehensive Agriculture Development Programme
CAADP4	CAADP Pillar 4
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CORAF(/ WECARD)	Conseil Ouest et Centre Africain pour la Recherche et le Développement Agricoles/ West and Central African Council for Agricultural Research and Development
DFID	Department for International Development
DGDC	Directorate General for Development Cooperation (Belgium)
DGIS	Directorate General for Development Cooperation (Netherlands)
DIE	German Development Institute
DP	Development Partners
EAAPP	East African Agricultural Productivity Project
EC	European Commission
ECA	East and Central Africa
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIARD	European Initiative for Agricultural Research for Development
EU	European Union
FAAP	Framework for African Agricultural Productivity
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FARA	Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa
GAFSP	Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme
GART	Golden Valley Agricultural Research Trust
GDPRD	Global Donor Platform for Rural Development
IARD	International Agricultural Research for Development (CGIAR – IITA)
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
INRAB	National Agricultural Research Institute of Benin
JAS	Joint Assistance Strategy
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
NARS	National Agricultural Research System
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NSF	Network Support Function
PD	The Paris Declaration
PDDAA (CAADP)	Programme Détaillé de Développement de l'Agriculture Africaine
PLI	Pillar Lead Institution
PSRSA	Plan Strategique de Relance du Secteur Agricole
R&D	Research and Development
REC	Regional Economic Council
ReSAKSS	Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System

## EIARD – Analysis of donor support to CAADP4

### Phase 2



SA	Southern Africa
SADC-FANR	Southern African Development Community - Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Directorate
SDC	Swiss agency for Development and Cooperation
SLM	Sustainable Land Management
SLWM	Sustainable Land and Water Management
SRO	Sub-Regional Organisation
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSA-CP	Sub-Saharan Africa Challenge Program (CGIAR)
SSQ	Semi Structured Questionnaire
SWAp	Sector-Wide Approach
SWOT	Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and Threat analysis method
TLC	Triple Line Consulting
WAAPP	West African Agricultural Productivity Project
WB	World Bank
WCA	West and Central Africa
ZARI	Zambia Agricultural Research Institute



## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. Overview

1. The Comprehensive Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) was adopted by the African Union (AU) Maputo assembly in 2003, as the ‘African-owned and -led initiative’ to improve food security, nutrition, and incomes in Africa's largely farm-based economies. The Programme’s twin objectives are to increase the proportion of national budgets invested in agriculture development to 10%, and to enable annual agricultural growth rates of 6% by 2015.

2. CAADP has four pillars:

#### **1. Land and water management**

Extending the area under sustainable land management.

#### **2. Market access**

Improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market access.

#### **3. Food supply and hunger**

Increasing food supply and reducing hunger.

#### **4. Agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption<sup>1</sup>**

NEPAD’s strategic commitment to agricultural research for development (ARD), with cross-cut linkage with the other pillars.

3. This ‘Analysis of donor support to CAADP Pillar 4’ – hereafter the Study – is for the European Initiative for Agricultural Research for Development (EIARD). Its purpose is:

*To provide EIARD with the knowledge and processes required to better coordinate and harmonise support to CAADP Pillar 4 both between EIARD members, and between EIARD members and other major donors.*

The Study is in two phases. Phase 1 focused on mapping donor support to ARD across Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This Phase 2 report examines the CAADP process and the way donors are supporting ARD in three case-study countries: Benin, Tanzania and Zambia. (ToR are at Appendix 1.)

### 1.2. Highlights of the Phase 1 Study

4. CAADP is supported by a range of donors and funding channels are complex. Challenge funds and joint-donor trust funds are common. As well as the CGIAR, funds from an individual donor country can flow through multilaterals and a range of other through intermediaries like FARA, the SROs and AGRA. There are cases where more than one intermediary organisation is involved. Phase 1 questioned the extent to which this layering of managing agencies adds sufficient value to offset an unavoidable increase in transactions costs.

5. Donor support to ARD in SSA is a very large, complex resource. Phase 1 found that official aid databases poorly populated and out of date, without the detail needed to map this resource effectively. Even for EIARD members, it was not possible to gather a complete dataset. Subject to these caveats, total funding to ARD in Sub-Saharan Africa was estimated at US\$ 468M per annum, 35% of it from EIARD members. US\$ 304M pa or 65% of the total is channelled through the CGIAR system. The non-CGIAR element is known to be under-estimated, but not by so much as to change the overall balance. Some 10% of the total funding goes to agencies mandated under CAADP to

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<sup>1</sup> - <http://www.nepad.org/foodsecurity/agriculture/research>



support Pillar 4: FARA and the three sub-regional organisations, ASARECA, CORAF and SADC-FANR.

6. The Study suggested that despite the weaknesses in the current information sources and system it should not be an especially difficult or expensive task to develop a unified and functional system to track support to ARD in SSA. Provided, that is, the managers of donor funds have the will to make such a common system work by submitting their information and keeping it up to date.

7. National capacities are a critical factor in the success of the CAADP process. There are signs that it has been a limiting factor in a number of countries. Phase 1 was not able to map donor support to ARD capacity building accurately, but it suggested that it is an area which needs greater attention.

8. The Phase 1 mapping revealed the importance of some new donors and agencies. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) is the second largest donor to CGIAR and the third largest outside CGIAR: through AGRA, AECF, AATF etc. The Study noted that donor efforts to reduce the number of partners an African country has to deal with is being offset by the increased number of regional agencies. China, India and Brazil are increasingly important development partners for African. However, outside CGIAR, they do not seem to be making significant contributions to ARD.

9. Most donors have a stated aim to increase their support to agricultural development in Africa and CAADP is commonly referred to in their agricultural policies and strategy documents, at least as the framework within which the donor intends to operate. Statements of committed support for CAADP are less frequent. No donor appears to have explicitly mapped their support to the four CAADP pillars. Most continue to rely on their internal planning frameworks in setting their policies and strategies for the support of SSA ARD. However, a number of donors have contributed to the CAADP process, through the different trust funds and CAADP-mandated agencies.

10. Irrespective of the uncertainties of the funding estimates, Phase 1 mapping showed that CGIAR is the default recipient of funding for SSA ARD, with a major influence on the research agenda. The current CGIAR reform process will be fundamental to developments over the next few years. Phase 1 expressed concern that the draft CGIAR Strategy and Results Framework makes just three, rather general references to CAADP. Beyond a footnote, the Paris Declaration questions of ownership, mutual accountability, and alignment are not discussed. The key driver of the CGIAR strategy appears to be a GIS-based analysis of ‘Development Domains and Agricultural Systems’, rather than a more explicitly demand-led orientation, e.g. a mapping which links demand for CGIAR products to Africa’s ARD needs and development potential.

11. Phase 1 presented a simple assessment. Ownership of the CAADP method and process as a strategy for agricultural development appeared strong – at least down to the level of the CAADP mandate agencies. At the country level reports were less positive. For Alignment, donors recognise CAADP as the context within which they should support ARD, but it is not clear that this has been reflected in any re-alignment of their programmes. There was clearer evidence of alignment at the regional level, through the clustering of donor support to the FARA strategic portfolio and to the SROs’ Multi Donor Trust Funds. Phase 1 noted that Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have the largest share of ASARECA research projects; an indication perhaps that SROs do not necessarily guarantee equity, or alignment. If joint- or pooled-funding is an indicator, donor Harmonisation is moderately widespread.

12. This Study is not an evaluation and no assessment is made of the last two Paris Declaration principles: ‘managing for results’ and ‘mutual accountability’. Phase 1 noted, however, that ‘managing for results’ and ‘accountability’ both depend on reliable information, especially information on the level and allocation of funds. If donor support to ARD in SSA is to be ‘managed for results’, substantial improvements will be needed in the various programme and project databases to better establish linkage and accountability between donor (and other) support and its outcomes and impacts.



### 1.3. Phase 2 Tasks

13. Phase 2 involves five tasks:

- Qualitative assessment of the CAADP process in the case study countries (Tanzania, Benin and Zambia) considering also previous analyses undertaken by others.
- Mapping of support to CAADP Pillar 4 in the selected country case studies and where possible an assessment of the approximate support to CAADP pillar 4 vs. support to other pillars of CAADP.
- Assessment of support to Pillar 4 to identify areas where support appears to be adequately coordinated between donors resulting in effectiveness and efficiency of support leading to high ‘aid effectiveness’ and areas with contrasting characteristics and potentially low aid effectiveness.
- Analysis and interpretation of factors involved in efficiencies or inefficiencies and how they can, respectively, be improved or avoided/ overcome.
- Identifying opportunities for systems and processes to improve donor coordination in relation to CAADP pillar IV.

14. This report is divided into five further sections. Section 2 summarises the CAADP Process and notes the conclusions of some recent reviews. Section 33 presents the three case studies, reviewing the CAADP process and the allocation of donor support to ARD in each country. The Study circulated a Semi-Structured Questionnaire (SSQ) to key stakeholders. The results are presented in Section 44. This material is used to make an assessment of the coordination and likely effectiveness of donor support to ARD in Section 55. The last section (6) outlines possible opportunities the Study has identified to improve the coordination of donor support to ARD in SSA.

15. The Study ToR and the SSQs are provided in a separate volume of appendices. The portfolios of ARD projects identified for each of the three case study countries are presented in an Excel spreadsheet.

### 1.4. Method

16. The Study is based on a review of available documents and websites; supported by contact with key informants and stakeholders, mainly by email but also by telephone. The views of a wide range of key actors were sought on the CAADP process its support structures, and on the extent to which the Paris Declaration principles are being achieved. This was done through emailed semi-structured questionnaires (SSQ – shown at Appendix 2 and 3) structured around the SWOT analysis method. The following organisations were invited to contribute:

- CAADP: NEPAD, CAADP, FARA, COMESA, ECOWAS, SADC, ASARECA, CORAF, SADC-FANR.
- CGIAR: IFPRI<sup>2</sup>, ASTI<sup>3</sup>, RESAKSS<sup>4</sup>, CGIAR Research Map<sup>5</sup>.
- NARS: Benin - INRAB<sup>6</sup>, Tanzania – CAADP Country Focal Point, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, Zambia - ZARI<sup>7</sup>.
- UN and Other Agencies: FAO.

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<sup>2</sup> - <http://www.ifpri.org/>

<sup>3</sup> - <http://www.asti.cgiar.org/>

<sup>4</sup> - <http://www.resakss.org/>

<sup>5</sup> - <http://ongoing-research.cgiar.org/>

<sup>6</sup> - <http://www.inrab.bj.refer.org/>

<sup>7</sup> - <http://www.zari.gov.zm/>





- Donors: IFAD, World Bank, Bilaterals.

17. The response to the SSQs was poor, despite repeat follow-up requests. There were 7 respondents from NEPAD, CAADP, FARA and CORAF. Of the three countries, there was 1 response from Benin, six from Zambia and none from Tanzania. Those responding are listed in the Acknowledgements section of this report. The poor response from Benin was partly due to a loss of internet connectivity. Where received, individual responses were full and provided objective and balanced assessments of the positive and negative aspects of topics and constructive suggestions.

18. The low number and poor distribution of SSQ responses means that the study evidence and interpretation needs to be treated with caution. However, SSQ responses are only a part of the evidence and it is important to recognise the validity of the sum of the information that was available.

## 2. The Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme

19. Since its launch in 2002, CAADP has developed into an ambitious programme. Its complex architecture involves a large number of international, regional and national organisations. Many countries have made significant progress in implementing the programme, and a significant body of experience has been developed. This section presents an overview of the architecture and highlights from recent reviews of progress and impact.

Table 1 The CAADP Process

<i>Process Benchmarks</i>	<i>'Action points/ Deliverables/ Indicators'</i>	<i>Documentation</i>
<b>1. Engagement with stakeholders and public</b>	1. Government buy-in and assumption of leadership responsibility.	
	2. Key stakeholders (including DPs) engaged around a common commitment to move with the CAADP agenda	Background documents
	3. Public awareness of the CAADP agenda	
	4. Formal launch of the CAADP agenda implementation	
<b>2. Evidence-based analysis – deepening understanding around common priorities</b>	5. Stocktaking and analytical work commissioned	Stocktaking documents
	6. Reports of studies submitted	
<b>3. Development of investment programs, partnerships and alliances</b>	7. Working groups suggest best options for intervention	
	8. Validation workshop: national consensus on the drivers of growth and priorities and level of investments required	Draft Compact
	9. Agreement on the identified priority areas of investments by national and international partners	Country CAADP Compact signing
<b>4. Assessment and learning from process and practice and adaptation and re-planning</b>	10. Initial set of core investment programmes developed	Post-Compact Roadmap
	11. Clearly articulated implementation modalities with roles of key players clarified	
	12. Capacity requirements for programme implementation defined and integrated in the programme design	Post-Compact Preliminary Comments
	13. Cost assessed and required resources mobilised and committed (including government investment financing)	
	14. M&E framework agreed upon	Post-Compact Review
	15. Monitoring mechanism in place linked to the peer review mechanism	



## 2.1. The CAADP Architecture

20. CAADP is an enabling framework, setting out key principles and targets for agricultural development. Individual countries implement the CAADP agenda in their own way, following the implementation process summarised in Table 1. The process is centred on the signature of a Country Compact which commits Government, its international development partners (DPs) and other stakeholders to a national strategy for agricultural development. The Country Compact is implemented through an Agriculture Investment Plan. *‘In accordance with the Paris Declaration and Accra Action Agenda commitments, all parties would pledge not to fund programmes or projects outside the investment plan, neither “off plan” nor “off budget.”’*<sup>8</sup>

21. Three Regional Economic Communities (RECs) – COMESA, ECOWAS and SADCC - are responsible for helping individual countries to implement the CAADP process. In NEPAD, a CAADP Secretariat provides support and resource materials. A Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) managed by the World Bank funds the process at regional and country levels. This is through ‘Child Trust Funds’ for each of NEPAD and the three RECs.

22. A Pillar Lead Institution (PLI) is nominated for each of CAADP’s four technical pillars. These provide countries with technical guidance, support and resources to develop and implement their plans. The Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) is PLI for Pillar 4. It is funded by another MDTF. FARA has led the preparation of a Framework for African Agricultural Productivity (FAAP) and an Operational Guide for country-based ARD initiatives. FARA is supported by three sub-regional agricultural research organisations (SROs)<sup>9</sup>; each one with its associated MDTF:

- Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa (ASARECA)<sup>10</sup>
- West and Central African Council for Agricultural Research and Development (CORAF/WECARD)<sup>11</sup>
- Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Directorate of the Southern African Development Community (SADC-FNAR)<sup>12</sup>

23. The structure of MDTFs and Child Trust Funds is designed to allow consortia of donors to package their funding for the different institutions involved, and to coordinate their support. However, it has created its own complexities. At the extreme it might mean that agriculture sector organisations in a given country will have to deal with and be funded through 10 different MDTF channels: AU-NEPAD, the REC, four PLIs and an SRO associated with each PLI. Further complexity is added by the fact that the PLIs and the SROs are also funded bilaterally, and through other pooled funds. In FARA’s case, the MDTF is only expected to fund 32% of its 2011 budget<sup>13</sup>; while ASARECA is implementing the very large East Africa Productivity Programme and a number of programmes funded by bilateral donors.<sup>14</sup>

24. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) have played leading technical roles in CAADP. IFPRI manages the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS). This provides research on agricultural development policy and a central data resource monitoring each country’s progress towards the CAADP objectives. IFPRI’s modelling of the agricultural growth rate required to meet MDG poverty reduction targets underpins many of the CAADP Investment Plans. IFPRI and FAO

<sup>8</sup> - <http://www.donorplatform.org/activities/caadp/caadp.html>

<sup>9</sup> - <http://www.fara-africa.org/>

<sup>10</sup> - <http://www.asareca.org/index.php?a=1>

<sup>11</sup> - <http://www.coraf.org/English/English.html>

<sup>12</sup> - <http://www.sadc.int/fanr/agricresearch/index.php>

<sup>13</sup> - [http://www.caadp.net/pdf/Presentation\\_10.pdf](http://www.caadp.net/pdf/Presentation_10.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> ASARECA Annual Report, 2009



staff have facilitated the roundtable process in a number of countries. This work has been funded by USAID, DFID, SIDA and BMGF. Of particular relevance for Pillar 4, IFPRI also facilitates the Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators initiative (ASTI). This provides cross-country data on agricultural R&D investments and capacity. ASTI is currently supported by BMGF.

25. The Global Donor Platform for Rural Development (GDPRD) is another actor in the CAADP process. This network of 34 bilateral and multilateral donors aims to build consensus on key issues, and thus promote harmonisation and alignment between donor policies. It has established a dedicated CAADP Development Partner Task Team and convenes Partnership Platform meetings twice a year to review the progress of CAADP. GDPRD has issued Guidelines for Donor Support to the CAADP Process at a Country-Level.

26. Donors have also established arrangements for coordination at the country level. Most countries now have some form of Agriculture Sector Working Group (ASWG) and a code of conduct governing donor relations with Government. The more advanced arrangements encourage a division of labour between active, or lead donors, in a sector and others, who may contribute to the sector but who delegate their oversight to one of the active members. In Tanzania, for example, the World Bank and Ireland are in the lead for agriculture, but DFID does not attend the working group. Most traditional bilateral and multilateral donors are represented on the ASWGs. Newer donors, such as AGRA and BMGF, are not.

27. CAADP is not intended as a mechanism for funding agricultural development. Governments are expected to make the first commitment to that, by meeting the target of 10% of budgets going to agriculture. This will still leave a large funding gap. To help to fill this, the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP) will make as much as \$1 billion available for agriculture development worldwide. This is likely to be a major source of funding for the CAADP Agriculture Investment Plans. However, this depends on countries submitting adequate funding proposals. Benin, for example, failed to win funding under the 2010 funding round. Tanzania and Zambia have yet to submit proposals. Of 12 countries funded by GAFSP to date, only five are from Africa.

## **2.2. Recent Reviews of CAADP**

28. This section looks at recent CAADP progress, drawing mainly on two recent studies:

- “*Agricultural policies in Sub-Saharan Africa: understanding CAADP and APRM policy Processes*” by the German Development Institute (DIE, 2009). (See Section 2.2.1)
- “*CAADP Review: Renewing the commitment to African Agriculture*” by CAADP-NEPAD (NEPAD-CAADP, 2010). (See 2.2.2)

An IFPRI review of CAADP in Ghana is also relevant (see 2.2.3); together with a GDPRD report describing donor efforts to coordinate their support to agriculture at the country level (see 2.2.4).

29. Since 2002, CAADP has evolved in a number of ways: from a re-launch to CAADP Phase 2 in 2005 through to a revised ‘CAADP Process’ presented in the 2010 CAADP “Guide for Implementers” (see Table 1). This evolution can be expected to continue since flexibility is essential to adapt to differing country circumstances. The appendix to the 2010 guide documents key implementation lessons and recommendations for improvements to the process demonstrating that efforts are being made to address the developing needs of the CAADP process. However, the Study notes that these changes have not yet been reflected on the websites of NEPAD-CAADP and the CAADP-mandated agencies. In a complex process involving multiple agencies, it is inevitable that interpretations of the principles and the lessons from experience will vary. However, this variability suggests a lack of unity of purpose and process within the CAADP mandate.

### **2.2.1. Understanding CAAP and APRM Policy Processes**

30. This 2009 study by the German Development Institute (DIE) examined how CAADP and the related NEPAD initiative, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), had influenced country



policies and strategies in Ghana, Kenya and Uganda. The study found that while the CAADP could add value to the national agricultural policy process, it had not led to the desired improvements in participation, ownership, use of evidence and alignment. It concluded that CAADP had the potential to influence national policy, but that it had a long way to go to achieving this potential.

31. The study found that prior to CAADP all three countries had already made significant commitments to agriculture in their poverty reduction strategies, and both Kenya and Ghana had made progress in establishing procedures for public participation and ownership, for evidence-based policy making and for donor coordination. In this context, CAADP's contribution was disappointing. *“While at the continental and global levels CAADP has been a strong instrument to obtain commitment to agriculture from governments and donors alike, CAADP at the country level seems to be weak and not to be meeting expectations ...”*<sup>15</sup>. There were four important weaknesses:

- Support from the RECs and other organisations was diluted by working in a large number of countries;
- The national context was limited by low ambitions, poor visibility and inadequate budgets;
- Peer review was neglected, evidence generation was weak, and participation was cursory;
- The CAADP process was not communicated to stakeholders and to the public.

32. Overall, CAADP was not well aligned with existing national frameworks and processes. In Rwanda, for example, there was a feeling that the Country Compact merely duplicated work that had already been done on the Strategic Programme for Agricultural Transformation, and that the final result was vague and lacking specific commitments by the compact signatories. A key finding was that CAADP implementation was unrealistically frontloaded on the Roundtable Process and signature of the Country Compact. The long-term effort needed to take things forward after that signature was underestimated. The result was that policy analysis was weak and insufficient evidence was developed to support it. There was a crucial lack of capacity development. Here the function of the Pillar Lead Institutions (PLIs), ReSAKSS and other support organisations was not being realised, particularly for capacity development.

33. The DIE study recommended that CAADP should focus on a limited number of countries that are willing and able to implement the process. Greater resources and capacity should be provided to support those countries and raise the quality of the process as a whole.

### **2.2.2. The CAADP Review**

34. This 2009 review was commissioned by the NEPAD Secretariat and up-dated in 2010. It drew on consultations with 15 countries, as well as the mandated CAADP organisations (RECs, PLIs etc), the development partners, regional farmers' organisations and the private sector. The review's frank conclusions are summed up in the statement: *“... CAADP stands at a critical point: it has successfully assembled the support of DPs behind CAADP and now has promising tools and the resources with which to implement the process at country level. However, until the latter part of 2009 there was little to show on the ground, and this could jeopardise future support.”*<sup>16</sup> Most of the findings on Effectiveness were quite critical:

- Rather than the intended *framework*, CAADP has been understood as *programme*, delivering investment funds. It is unclear whether it should stick to the framework concept or become an active player delivering *“continental public goods”*.
- Support from the RECs has been *“generally deficient”*, and attempting to launch the process simultaneously across two-thirds of Africa was too ambitious.

<sup>15</sup> *“Agricultural policies in Sub-Saharan Africa: understanding CAADP and APRM policy Processes”*, German Development Institute (DIE), 2009,

<sup>16</sup> *“CAADP Review: Renewing the commitment to African Agriculture”*, CAADP-NEPAD, 2010



- With the support of MDTFs, three of the four pillars, including Pillar 4, have had an impact.
- A high threshold of approval for the Compacts has frustrated progress.
- It is not clear whether CAADP has built capacity, nor that ReSAKSS, which only operates in a few countries, has delivered higher quality planning outputs.
- CAADP has not had much impact on national strategies and policies. Econometric modelling is of little use when country data is so poor.
- Donors have come together to support CAADP and it has strengthened the capacity of governments to engage with donors on agriculture sector issues.
- Responsibilities within the CAADP governance structure are overlapping. They are poorly defined and do not match the different organisations' capacities.

35. Under the heading Sustainability, the review identifies two critical weaknesses. First, “*there is a surprising lack of vision of how [CAADP’s] medium-term objectives will be met beyond implementing the roundtable process and the signing of compacts.*” Most important of all, it raises the critical question of absorptive capacity: “*CAADP has not shown whether the level of investments that have been estimated as being needed to transform African agriculture could be absorbed.*” Inefficiency and underspending both point to major lack of institutional and of human capacity.

36. The review contrasts CAADP’s relative success at the continental level with poorer results at the country level. At the higher level, funds have been mobilised and PLIs such as FARA have made progress in implementing their mandate; although a lack of Pillar 4 support to the livestock sector is noted. In contrast, the review found no evidence that CAADP had significantly changed the way DPs and government interact at the country level. Although it had strengthened government capacity to engage with DPs, this was paradoxically combined with weak national ownership. The Country Focal Point system needs to be strengthened to raise country ownership, and to leverage more coherent and adequate donor assistance. This should be done within a national institution capable of providing the authority and skills needed to be effective.

37. The overall findings of the CAADP Review were very similar to those of the DIE study: that it has succeeded in securing strong commitment from the main DPs; that it has the potential to strengthen agricultural development processes at the country level; and, that it has developed the tools and resources to realise this potential. However, there is a long way to go before the potential becomes a reality. The Review’s frank recognition of the weaknesses, including a poor assessment of the CAADP Secretariat, indicated the will to overcome them. Unfortunately, there is no more recent study to assess how far that will has been translated into action and outcomes.

### **2.2.3. CAADP in Ghana**

38. The IFPRI Ghana Case Study<sup>17</sup> reaches similar conclusions to DIE and the CAADP Review. It emphasises that national ownership is fundamental, but finds that the CAADP process had not built ownership in Ghana. Instead it was perceived as “*externally driven*”, a perception which was reinforced by ambiguity about the roles of the different regional and continental organisations involved. Alignment with the CAADP Pillars and objectives was not helpful, creating “*a tendency to feel that the country is already “compliant” and to avoid any deeper analysis of opportunities forgone in the sector.*”

39. As with the other studies, IFPRI identified the need for a more intensive post-compact process:
- to address key governance issues in the agriculture sector
  - to build capacity in policy formation and analysis

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<sup>17</sup> - “*Do CAADP Processes Make a Difference to Country Commitments to Develop Agriculture?: The Case of Ghana*”, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01006 (IFPRI, 2010a).



- to analyse efficiency and returns on expenditure in different sub-sectors
- to develop the data needed to support evidence-based policy making

#### 2.2.4. Donor Coordination

40. In each country, CAADP must work within the framework of existing structures for donor coordination. To a considerable extent, its success depends on those structures. A 2008 GDPRD study reviewed arrangements in 15 SSA countries<sup>18</sup>. The Study's key findings can be summarised as follows:

- Many countries have agricultural strategies which guide donor-government relations in the sector
- Not all of these platforms include either non-state domestic stakeholders or non-traditional donors such as BMGF
- Donor working groups show “weaknesses that need to be rectified if these groups are to be seen as credible structures.”
- There tends to be proliferation and fragmentation of agriculture related sub-working groups across different sectors
- To be effective the working groups need to become “collectively-funded organisational hubs with results-based annual work plans and rule-based and predictable leadership.”
- CAADP organisations need to establish closer interaction with the working groups to encourage their involvement in the country-level CAADP process

#### 2.3. SSQ Responses on CAADP Process

41. There were 16 responses to the Study semi-structured questionnaires: from Benin, Zambia, NEPAD, CAADP, FARA and CORAF. As already noted, this evidence needs to be interpreted with caution due to the low number of responses although the low numbers are partly offset by the diversity of respondents and the completeness of the individual responses.

42. The CAADP process is well regarded by respondents who were evenly split in regarding the process as ‘Good’ (Very few improvements needed) and ‘Adequate’ (Some improvements needed). For the majority, the responses validate the issues identified by the DIE and CAADP reviews and support existing efforts to enhance the CAADP process. Five priority themes can be identified from the SSQ responses.

##### *African owned, led and implemented*

- The issue of CAADP being African owned and Africa implemented is consistently important (across Strengths, Weaknesses and Opportunities). As a Strength, the CAADP process “provides priority focus based on a regional and country approaches and not on donors’ areas of interest”. This links to a Weaknesses that it creates “the perception at the country level that CAADP is not Africa-led or Africa-owned and that it is an additional and externally driven planning exercise”. Donors can help reinforce the ‘Africanness’ of CAADP, giving priority to “engaging more African experts (as consultants and TA) and partnering with regional institutions”.

##### *Donor Coordination*

- CAADP is identified as a vehicle for donors to improve budget and intervention rationalisation and harmonization among themselves, and to be more closely involved in national development discussions by being “more pro-active in the CAADP process”. Such engagement would

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<sup>18</sup> An Overview of Agricultural Donor Coordination Structures at the Country Level, GDPRD, December 2008



provide donors with their own sense of ownership of a country's agricultural development process and improve the quality and relevance of their part in that country process.

#### *Ensuring the reform agenda*

- Donors should consider carefully one reported Weakness, that of “the need to address the more immediate and pressing food and poverty needs compromises the ability to address reform objectives”. Achieving long-term reform objectives is central to sustainable and effective development. To help keep reform on track, donors need to be better able to resist national and regional political pressures that distract from those objectives.

#### *Capacity development*

- Poor country capacity is identified as a Weakness. The specific suggestion is to include strong representation from agricultural education and training institutions in the CAADP process to ensure that capacity strengthening elements/ issues are included in the investment programmes. Responses on this theme reinforce the recommendations from Phase 1 for much improved donor coordination of their existing support for capacity development via their ‘partnership programmes’. Ideally this would be via a common/ unified support programme with individual donors providing defined contributions against their comparative advantages based on existing programme coverage. This would be analogous to the ‘task-sharing’ arrangements found in donor working groups.

#### *Role and linkage with CGIAR*

- The identification of ‘poor linkages with CGIAR centres’ as a Weakness and achieving ‘stronger integration of the CGIAR with the SROs and FARA’ as an Opportunity by SSQ respondents is particularly relevant to Donors. Their consolidated support of the CGIAR system is the largest and most practical agency and lever for delivering this change.

43. The SSQ included a question on the support provided for implementing the CAADP process. There were only eight responses on this, so the results need to be treated with additional caution. Despite significant Strengths of the support provided, a quarter of the respondents rated the support as “Poor - many improvements needed.”<sup>19</sup> Stronger evidence is needed to allow specific recommendations for improvement. Nevertheless, the SSQ responses reinforce the findings of the DIE Study and the CAAP Review. Concerns over method included a need for ‘improved communication’ and ‘stronger engagement of policy makers.’ ‘Insufficiently wide and effective representation of stakeholders’ was reported. ‘Improved capacity for, and improved, M&E’ was another need identified. There were also specific concerns over the support provided to the process: ‘inadequate support process’, and a ‘need for more diversified expertise’. In order to provide the level of support needed, the earlier studies recommended that support and managerial functions for the CAADP process should be vested in national level institutions, so as to give them the critical mass of effort and authority to be effective.

44. SSQ respondents tended to confuse support to the CAADP Process and the Outcomes of the process. For example, Weaknesses reported under this heading included donor funding mechanisms and conditionalities, harmonisation, stakeholder representation and the integration of ARD into investment plans.

## **2.4. Econometric Analysis and Investment Planning**

45. Many Country Compacts and the Agriculture Investment Plans prepared under CAADP have been informed by, if not based on agro-econometric modelling and analyses carried out by IFPRI/ ReSAKSS. These have been used to calculate the agricultural growth rates needed to meet MDG targets for poverty reduction, and in some cases to estimate what level of agricultural investment would generate the necessary growth rate. Of the three case study countries, a Computable General

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<sup>19</sup> - The balance of the ratings from four respondents given as 2-good, 4-adequate and 2-poor.



Equilibrium (CGE) model was used in Zambia<sup>20</sup> and Tanzania<sup>21</sup> to analyze the linkages and trade-offs between economic growth and poverty reduction at both the macro- and micro-economic levels. In Benin<sup>22</sup>, the DREAM model (Dynamic Research Evaluation for Management) is used to quantify impacts of productivity-enhancing investments in agriculture R&D across major commodities and area development domains to help identify alternative development priorities for agriculture in West Africa at the country and regional levels. These analyses and their findings are discussed within each country case study (Benin para. 52, Tanzania 84, Zambia 112).

46. Assessing the validity and utility of these calculations is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is however worth noting again the doubts expressed in the CAADP Review about the value of econometric models based on weak data. (These issues are discussed in more detail in the Tanzania Country Case Study below.)

### 3. Country Case Studies

47. This section presents an analysis of Donor Support to CAADP Pillar 4 in each of three countries, Benin, Tanzania and Zambia. To set the context, each case study starts with a brief review of the country's agriculture sector. This is followed by a description of how the country has progressed with CAADP and a review of its current capacities and policies for ARD. Each study ends with an assessment of how far current donor support to ARD matches the country's needs, and is well integrated with its policies for and management of the agriculture sector.

48. Table 2 presents summary statistics which highlight important differences between the three countries, as well as some similarities:

- Zambia has the highest per capita incomes and the lowest dependence on agriculture. At less than 1% per annum, Zambia's agricultural growth rate is particularly low.
- Tanzania is the largest and the poorest country, but GDP grew at 7% per annum in the ten years to 2009, versus 5.2% for Zambia and 4.1% for Benin.<sup>23</sup>
- Relative to the number of farmers, Tanzania's research capability is nearly twice the size of the other two countries.
- With only \$38,000 per researcher, Zambia's ARD system is underfunded. The other two countries both have over \$100,000 per researcher.

49. All three countries have shown relatively strong economic growth through the 2000s: between 4 and 7%. However, it is a fundamental part of development that agriculture will grow more slowly than the rest of the economy as industrial and service sectors expand. It will be difficult for any of the three countries to come close to the CAADP target of 6% unless national growth accelerates further. At around six percent, agricultural investment is well below the CAADP target of 10% in all three countries. In Benin and Tanzania, at least, it fell in 2008. For this study, however, the most important similarity is the low level of ARD expenditure relative to Agricultural GDP: well below the recommended level of 1.0%, which some suggest is too low anyway.

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<sup>20</sup> - <http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/pubs/pubs/dp/ifpridp00791.pdf>

<sup>21</sup> Agricultural Growth Poverty and Nutrition in Tanzania, IFPRI Discussion Paper 00947, 2010

<sup>22</sup> - <http://www.resakss.org/index.php?pdf=39386>

<sup>23</sup> Checking with the National Accounts for Tanzania, it would appear that ReSAKSS is reporting nominal growth rates. Corrected for inflation, the National Accounts report agricultural growth of 4.6% for 2008, and an average of 4.3%, 1999 - 2009.





Table 2 Summary ARD Statistics for three SSA Countries

Variable\ Country	Benin	Tanzania	Zambia
Population M – ‘09	8.9	42.5	12.9
GNI Per Cap – ‘09	\$750	\$490	\$960
GDP Growth Rate % ‘99 -‘09	4.1%	7.0%	5.2%
Ag as % of GDP <sup>24</sup>	33.2%	29.7%	21.6%
Source: World Bank			
AgDP Growth Rate %	5.3 (since 1991) 3.8 (2008)	>5% (2000s) 10.8 (2008) <sup>25</sup>	0.9 (2000s)
Ag Inv % of total	6.6 (since 1996) 4.5 (2008)	< 6% (‘04 – ‘07) 2.5% (2008)	7.0 (‘05-‘07)
Source: ReSAKSS			
Total ARD spend US\$ M 2005 PPP	21.6	78.2	8.1
Per capita ARD spend (US\$/Popn M)	2.43	1.84	0.63
ARD as % of AgDP	0.7	0.5	0.3
Total FTE researchers	115	673	212
FTE researchers per M farmers	71	42	68
Source: ASTI			

### 3.1. Benin

#### 3.1.1. The Agricultural Economy

50. There is little recent data on the part agriculture plays in Benin’s economy. Available estimates indicate that the sector still represents over 30% of GDP and that cotton remains the dominant commercial crop, contributing 32% of exports between 2003 and 2005. Statistics on cropped areas are not available, but some indication of the relative importance of different crops can be gained from the 2007 production figures.<sup>26</sup>

	‘000 Tonnes
• Maize	932
• Rice (Paddy)	72
• Pineapple	150
• Cashew	62
• Oil Palm	280
• Cassava	2,809
• Yam	1,450
• Cotton	242

There are estimated to be some 550,000 small farmers in eight agro-ecological zones. There is a small commercial sector, mainly confined to plantation crops - oil palm, cashew, citrus and mango – and to battery poultry production.<sup>27</sup>

51. Benin’s Plan D’Investissement Agricole, prepared as part of the CAADP process, sets out development programmes for crops, livestock, fisheries and sector administration and support. For agriculture, as an example, two specific objectives are set: to raise production and reduce the cost of subsistence crops, and to encourage the development of crops with market potential. All the crops in the list above are targeted, except for Yam and Cotton. Mechanisation is given prominence, with a target of raising mechanisation from 1% of farms in 2006 to 20% in 2015.

<sup>24</sup> Benin data from Internet, 2007, source unclear

<sup>25</sup> See note 22

<sup>26</sup> Reported in Benin: CAADP Brief 1, [www.resakss.org](http://www.resakss.org)

<sup>27</sup> Plan D’Investissement Agricole, 2010 – 15, Ministry of Agriculture/Ministry of Finance, Benin



52. ReSAKSS analysis in 2008<sup>28</sup> estimated that Benin was not on track to halve the 1990 national poverty rate by 2015. At 36%, the poverty ratio had increased since 1990. To halve this by 2015, agricultural growth of at least 7.6 % per annum would be needed. This would be feasible, since Benin had, as recently as 2002, achieved rates over 7 %; but spending on agriculture would need to increase by as much as 27 % annually. Given the declining trend in agriculture sector investment since 2006 this implies a large change in strategy.

### 3.1.2. CAADP Process

53. For CAADP, Benin is the most advanced of the case study countries. The CAADP Compact was signed in October 2009, the Plan Strategique de Relance du Secteur Agricole (PSRSA) was finalised in August 2010 and the Agricultural Investment Plan (AIP) 2010-2015<sup>29</sup> in September. The CAADP Post Compact review was published at the same time. The Benin ‘agricultural investment plan agreement’ meeting is scheduled for 2011. Benin also submitted a proposal to the GAFSP’s 2010 call for proposals, but it was unable to meet all the programme’s requirements. Initially, it seems that Benin was expecting GAFSP to fund the entire AIP.<sup>30</sup>

54. Benin’s stocktaking, growth and investment analysis was documented earlier in five brochures prepared by IFPRI.<sup>31</sup> These were based on contributions from multiple ministries in Benin, IFPRI, and ECOWAS with donor support from DFID, SIDA, USAID and BMZ. These short (8 page) Country Brochures present a general case for a mixed agriculture and non-agricultural sector investment and growth plan, as the most effective way to deliver MDG poverty and hunger reduction targets. Food crops are given priority, at the expense of exports (mainly cotton); based on the greater ability of food crops to generate income and food supply for smallholders.

### 3.1.3. Assessment of CAADP process

55. As there were no responses to the SSQ from Benin actors, the Study is unable to make a detailed review of the CAADP process from in-country sources. However, the response from Benin-stakeholders in CORAF and CAADP and Benin’s CAADP-related documentation shows that CAADP consultation and participation covered a range of stakeholders across all categories. More generally, the key CAADP process documents – country brochures, briefs, the PSRSA and the Agriculture Investment Plan - were well presented and complete. Since good CAADP process documentation is common to other ECOWAS countries an ‘ECOWAS factor’ is presumably involved in this outcome. Benin’s CAADP Compact is explicitly linked to the regional agricultural policy ECOWAP. It is also worth mentioning that Benin was given a ‘favourable but not uncritical’ rating under the Africa Peer Review Mechanism.<sup>32</sup> It is likely that Benin’s relatively strong national governance contributed to a sound CAADP process.

56. National AIPs are reviewed by the CAADP Secretariat of NEPAD. The main criticism of the Benin document concerned the high rates of GDP and agricultural GDP growth which were targeted: 8.9% and 14.3% respectively, equivalent to a 300% increase in agricultural growth. These rates were presumably based on ReSAKSS modelling to allow Benin to achieve the MDG-1 target of halving poverty by 2015. CAADP reviewers recommended 9% as a more realistic rate for agricultural growth, although this meant the MDG target would not be achieved until 2020.

57. It is reassuring that neither Benin nor the reviewers felt bound by the 6% CAADP target. The reviewers’ willingness to suggest radical changes was also a strength. However, a brief review of the AIP suggests that it is a long way short of rigorous attempt to develop a realistic programme. As just one example, but a crucial one, the Investment Plan gives no indication of how the proposed costings would relate to the current government budget and resources available.

<sup>28</sup> - Johnson, M., *et al.* (2008) ReSAKSS Working Paper No. 22.

<sup>29</sup> - [http://www.gafspfund.org/gafsp/sites/gafspfund.org/files/Documents/Benin\\_1\\_of\\_5\\_Investment\\_Plan.pdf](http://www.gafspfund.org/gafsp/sites/gafspfund.org/files/Documents/Benin_1_of_5_Investment_Plan.pdf)

<sup>30</sup> - <http://www.gafspfund.org/gafsp/node/737>

<sup>31</sup> - <http://www.resakss.org/> website Benin: CAADP Implementation pages

<sup>32</sup> - <http://www.africanreview.org/docs/benin/aprmbeninjan08.pdf> and [http://afriMAP.org/english/images/report/AfriMAP\\_APRM\\_Benin\\_EN.pdf](http://afriMAP.org/english/images/report/AfriMAP_APRM_Benin_EN.pdf)



### 3.1.4. ARD Structure and Capacity

58. Since 2000, Benin’s ARD expenditures have increased, but staff capacity has declined slightly – from 120 FTE in 2000 to 115 FTE in 2008. This is equivalent to 71 FTE per million farmers. In 2008, ARD spending was 0.69% of agricultural GDP, also an increase from 2000. This is higher than some neighbouring countries, such as Togo (0.47) and Niger (0.17), but well below the internationally recommended level of 1%.

59. Despite increased government funding, agricultural research remains dependent on donor support. Between 2001 and 2008, a third of the National Agricultural Research Institute of Benin’s (INRAB) funding was from government, while foreign donors provided 50%. The remaining 17% was generated internally, mainly by sales.<sup>33</sup>

60. INRAB accounts for around 55% of ARD capacity and expenditures. It has been under a recruitment freeze; although the fall in capacity has been partly offset by higher agricultural research staffing at the Université d’Abomey-Calavi (UAC) and other institutes. These now represent 40% of national capacity. University salaries are 25 to 30% higher than INRAB.

61. Reform of public sector ARD was initiated by the World Bank in 1992 and continued under projects supported by Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. ASTI reports that the reforms have had limited success, but they have left a respected, effective and participatory agricultural research planning mechanism. This annual agricultural research management cycle is linked to a national competitive research fund. This fund is described by CIRAD<sup>34</sup> as a significant unifying and quality enhancing feature of Benin’s NARS.

#### Box 1 Key trends in ARD in Benin

- Agricultural R&D expenditure have gradually increased since 2000, reflecting enhanced government funding and greater involvement by the higher education sector, but agricultural research remains largely donor dependent.
- Benin faces a serious research capacity crisis. Staff levels at INRAB have dwindled and the high average age of scientists means that the most experienced researchers are nearing retirement.
- INRAB has difficulty retaining qualified researchers due to low salaries relative to universities and a public sector recruitment ban that limits opportunities.
- Urgent steps must be taken to boost scientific cooperation among research actors, cancel the hiring freeze, and provide young researchers with training opportunities.

62. ASTI’s estimates of allocation of researcher resources in 2008 were 42% involved in crop research, 11% in post-harvest research, 10% in livestock research, 8% in natural resources and 7% in forestry. The balance is on researchers concentrating on food security and socioeconomic research.

63. Despite the gradual increase in spending, ASTI says that Benin faces a serious capacity crisis (see Box 1). Staffing at INRAB has dwindled and most experienced researchers are nearing retirement. Low salaries and a recruitment ban add to the difficulty:

*“Stringent measures are required, and without delay, to enable Benin’s agricultural R&D agencies to face the current human resource crisis and increase their competitive advantage.”*

This seems to be recognised in the AIP, which allocates 17% of its budget (equivalent of US\$ 36M pa) to agricultural research, and an additional 6% to training and extension. This can be compared with a spend of just \$21 million in 2008. However, it remains to be seen whether the AIP will be funded.

<sup>33</sup> - <http://www.asti.cgiar.org/pdf/Benin-Note.pdf>

<sup>34</sup> - <http://www.cirad.bf/fr/anx/fichepays.php?codpays=BEN>



### 3.1.5. Donor Support for CAADP Pillar 4

64. Benin's donor-supported ARD portfolio is listed in Appendix 4. There are 62 projects. Just one of them is coordinated by INRAB, one by the Université d'Abomey-Calavi and one by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. All the rest are managed by CGIAR centres or other external institutes. At most, organisations based in Benin have a role in implementation. Of the projects, 31 are funded through CGIAR and 13 through CORAF. This section reviews the projects funded by each donor or intermediary agency, such as CGIAR or CORAF. Bilateral donor contributions to the intermediaries are ignored.

65. Nine different **CGIAR** centres are acting as project lead centre on the 31 projects. The African Rice Centre (ARC), which is based in Benin, has 12 projects. The second most frequent lead centre is IITA (7) (which has a specific focus on IARD) and the third is IFPRI. All of the CGIAR portfolio is made up of multi-country projects, with some 28 countries involved as implementers; although countries from the same sub-region as Benin are most commonly involved. The portfolio is strongly oriented to agriculture, with 20 crop and seven seed-systems projects. Policy and Institutions comes next (12 projects). Climate Change and Livestock have three projects each. Information on the funding for individual CGIAR projects is not available. However, Phase 1 data suggests that projects are typically between US\$ 0.3 and 0.5M per annum. Necessarily, therefore, individual CGIAR resources are thinly spread amongst collaborating countries and partners.

66. **CORAF** funds 13 projects in which Benin is involved. Six of these are described as 'Commissioned' (3 USAID GFSR funding) and the rest are 'Competitive' (3 MDTF, 1 ECOWAS, 1 CIRAD and 2 Unspecified). For two of the 13 projects the regional coordinating institution is in Benin (1 INRAB, 1 UAC). As for CGIAR, all the projects are multi-country. Ignoring projects implemented across the SSA, between three and seven countries are involved in each one. Also as for CGIAR, crops dominate with eight projects. Livestock has just two and there is one for socio-economics.

67. CORAF is the implementing agency for the World Bank funded West Africa Agricultural Productivity Project (WAAPP), which has the objective to "*generate and accelerate the adoption of improved technologies in the participating countries agricultural commodity priorities areas that are aligned with the sub-region's top agricultural commodity priorities, as outlined in the ECOWAP.*" Under WAAPP, Benin will have responsibility for the regional centre of excellence for maize.

68. **Belgium** has three ARD projects which involve Benin. One supports the Centre International de Recherches et de Développement sur l'Élevage en zone Subhumide, based in Burkina Faso. The second is the Institutional Support Project for Development and Diversification of Agricultural Sectors<sup>35</sup>, working with the MAEP to improve national agricultural policy. The last is to improve the Yam Bean. This is implemented by the CGIAR centre, CIP.

69. Bilaterally **Denmark** has supported the agricultural sector in Benin since 1997, with specific support to ARD reform. However, Danish development cooperation with Benin is being phased out at the end of current projects. Current Danish support to ARD is limited to higher degree training for five INRAB staff. Denmark also supports ARD in Benin through its funding of FARA's UNIBRAIN project.

70. **Germany** has five projects, implemented by the three international centres and the University of Hohenheim. Four of the five are regional, multi-country projects.

71. **Japan** has one project: a inland fisheries development study. This was requested by the MAEP to assess the poverty alleviation potential of inland aquaculture but it is not explicitly CAADP-related.

72. **France** is a non-responder to Study enquiries but it is known to provide substantial support to ARD and the agriculture sector in Benin. CIRAD has eight officers assigned to NARS, working on

<sup>35</sup> - [http://www.btcctb.org/files/web/Appui%20Institutionnel%20au%20Ministère%20de%20l'Agriculture,%20de%20l'élevage%20et%20de%20la%20Pêche%20\(AIMAEP\).pdf](http://www.btcctb.org/files/web/Appui%20Institutionnel%20au%20Ministère%20de%20l'Agriculture,%20de%20l'élevage%20et%20de%20la%20Pêche%20(AIMAEP).pdf)



cotton, oil palm, yam, plantain, mango and food crops.<sup>36</sup> CIRAD's West Africa website identifies 12 activities in Benin, across four themes.<sup>37</sup> There is not enough data to include these activities in the Study database.

73. **USAID** does not have a bilateral agriculture programme in Benin, but it is a major donor through commissioned projects with CORAF, as well as contributions to the FARA and CORAF MDTFs.

74. The **European Union** has a number of agriculture or rural development programmes in Benin. Most are focussed on production, seed-systems and market chains. They are likely to include some ARD components but they have not been included in the Study database. They are implemented by groups of international (CGIAR, etc) and national partner organisations. INRAB is the national partner in three of these programmes. The database does include three smaller projects, all multi-country: one on innovation systems and two on aspects of nutrition. A recently approved project, *Improved Income and food security for Producers through diversified organic production systems*, targets strengthening of agricultural research institutions as well as improved production methods, food security and adaptation to climate change. This is also multi-country and based in Mali.

75. **FAO** has 15 active projects in Benin, most of them sub-regional or multi-country projects.<sup>38</sup> None of them have a specific ARD focus. However, two are included in the Study database: “*Support to the implementation process of the NEPAD CAADP*” (2010-13) and “*CountrySTAT for Sub-Saharan Africa*” (2007-2100). FAO was reported by other stakeholders as directly involved in the CAADP process and the ADWG in Benin. Unfortunately, the FAO representative in Benin (as in Zambia and Tanzania) did not respond to the Study's email questionnaire.

### 3.1.6. Donor Support to Agriculture

76. Many of the bilateral donors listed above are supporting broader agricultural development in Benin. Production, value chains and small-holder livelihoods are commonest, usually in the context of a particular crop sector. Examples include PAFIRIZ,<sup>39</sup> a rice development project funded by the EU; Netherlands projects designed to increase producers' access to inputs using a 'harvest deposit' system and to promote *Jatropha* biofuel; the **BMGF**-funded '*African Cashew Initiative*'<sup>40</sup>; and, the EU's project *Realizing the potential agricultural areas of the lowlands in sub-Saharan Africa while maintaining their environmental services*. As for the ARD projects, many of these are multi-country and implemented by groupings of CGIAR and other centres with a limited implementation role for national partners.

### 3.1.7. Benin Overview

77. Of the 62 ARD-related projects in the Benin portfolio, 60 are multi-country with a regional or even a continental focus. The overwhelming majority are coordinated by CGIAR or other international and regional centres, with a limited implementation role for the Benin NARS. Time and space does not allow a detailed analysis, but the portfolio seems to be dominated by single-issue, single-crop projects. “Biological control for the coconut mite in sub-Saharan Africa” is an extreme example, but it makes the point. There is little evidence of either of the two components which might be expected to make up an ARD programme focussed on the needs of Benin:

- Research on country-specific problems, e.g. through an analysis of the requirements of the eight different agro-ecological zones. Despite it being a key component of Government's Agricultural

<sup>36</sup> - <http://www.ambafrance-bj.org/spip.php?article674>

<sup>37</sup> - <http://www.cirad.bf/fr/anx/fichepays.php?codpays=BEN>

<sup>38</sup> - <https://extranet.fao.org/fpmis/FPMISReportServlet.jsp?APD=&links=N&countryId=BJ&div=&fundG=&type=countryprofileopen&lng=EN&qlfrs=&UF=N&typeUF=&colorder=2345&pwB=&sorttype=1>

<sup>39</sup> - [http://www.btcctb.org/files/web/Projet%20d'Appui%20à%20la%20Filière%20Riz%20\(PAFIRIZ\).pdf](http://www.btcctb.org/files/web/Projet%20d'Appui%20à%20la%20Filière%20Riz%20(PAFIRIZ).pdf)

<sup>40</sup> - <http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Grants-2009/Pages/Deutsche-Gesellschaft-f-r-Internationale-Zusammenarbeit-GIZ-GmbH-OPP50493.aspx>



Investment Plan there is no research into mechanisation. Livestock also seems under-represented.

- A strategic effort to develop Benin's ARD capacity

Between 1992 and 2004, a concerted attempt was made to develop such an approach, supported by the World Bank, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. This culminated in the AGRAN project aimed at facilitating “*INRAB's transition, from a technical unit under the Ministry of Agriculture to a performing public enterprise, capable of developing efficient technologies based on end-user needs.*”<sup>41</sup> It would appear that this effort is no longer being supported.

78. It is important to note the limitations of this desk study. Larger agriculture development projects like PAFIRIZ may more closely tailored to country-specific needs. If they include an ARD component, it may be more demand-led than the portfolio identified by the study. It is also important to stress that a desk-study of this kind is by its nature superficial. It has not looked at the supporting material on the projects in the portfolio. This may demonstrate that some of them are better targeted on Benin's priority issues than can be inferred from the project title alone.

79. The most important conclusion concerns capacity. There is a clear imbalance between a large and diverse portfolio of relatively small projects, coordinated by a wide range international actors, and a weak National Agricultural Research System. It is quite unrealistic to expect a NARS staff of 115 full-time equivalent to engage effectively with 62 separate projects and their numerous sponsors.

## **3.2. Tanzania**

### **3.2.1. The Agricultural Economy**

80. Agriculture contributes nearly a third of Tanzania GDP. Over the decade to 2007, the economy grew at 6.6% per annum, while agriculture grew at 4.4%: some way below the CAADP target of 6%. Agriculture is by far the largest employer. In 2000/01, 70% of households were headed by a farmer or fisherman.<sup>42</sup> In 2006, agriculture provided 77% of employment, down from 82% just five years earlier.<sup>43</sup>

81. In other words, Tanzanian agriculture may not be meeting the CAADP target, but it is still making a strong development contribution. Agricultural employment is almost static but production is rising. In other words, the greater share of growth is coming from rising labour productivity. In this way the agriculture sector is providing the food and other materials the economy needs, while releasing labour for other sectors which are growing faster. Increasing labour productivity has also allowed food crop prices to fall, with a further strong contribution to poverty reduction. Between 1997 and 2004, food prices fell sharply behind inflation for all except highly preferred foods – fruit and meat.<sup>44</sup>

82. Tanzania is a land rich country. Of 44 million hectares of arable land only 10.8 million, barely a quarter, is currently in use.<sup>45</sup> There are nine major Agro Ecological Zones (AEZ), ranging from montane rainforest to semi-arid savannas, and 10 major cropping systems. These are listed below. Each system has very different potentials and constraints.

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<sup>41</sup> <http://www.asti.cgiar.org/pdf/Benin-Note.pdf>

<sup>42</sup> 2000/01 Household Budget Survey, National Bureau of Statistics, Dar Es Salaam, 2002

<sup>43</sup> Labour Force Survey, quoted in Agriculture Sector Review and Public Expenditure Review, 2008/9, MAFSC, Dar Es Salaam, 2008

<sup>44</sup> FAO Country Stats Producer Prices

<sup>45</sup> MAFSC, op. cit.



1. Banana/Coffee/Horticulture
2. Maize/Legume
3. Cashew/Coconut/Cassava
4. Rice/Sugar cane
5. Sorghum/Bulrush millet/Livestock
6. Tea/Maize/Pyrethrum
7. Cotton/Maize
8. Horticulture based
9. Wet – rice and irrigated
10. Pastoralists and Agropastoralist

83. Between 1997 and 2005, harvested areas have increased by at least 3% per annum. Of this the greatest contribution came from maize, with around 25% of the harvested area. Pulses, mostly beans, are the second most important by area. Yields for subsistence grains and roots have fallen: maize, millet, plantains and cassava. Although yields have risen for the higher value grains, rice and wheat, they are much less important in terms of area. The area of wheat actually fell over the period: by over 5% per annum.<sup>46</sup> To sum up, agricultural growth has been driven by increased labour productivity and area expansion. Land intensification and yield have contributed little.

84. As for Benin, IFPRI has argued that Tanzania is not on track to hit the poverty MDG. Despite GDP growth of 6.6% per annum, the poverty head count only fell by two percentage points between 2000 and 2007: from 35.7 to 33.6%.<sup>47</sup> To identify why, IFPRI looked at three questions:

*“First, is the level and structure of the current economic growth path consistent with the slow decline in national poverty and only modest improvement in caloric availability? Second, what is the contribution of agriculture in reducing poverty and raising caloric availability? Finally, which agricultural subsectors are most effective at achieving national growth, poverty, and nutrition objectives?”*

They conclude that agricultural growth has been concentrated in rice, wheat and three cash crops: cotton, sugar and tobacco. Because these are more often produced by commercial farmers, this growth did not contribute strongly to poverty reduction. By contrast, its computer model suggests that livestock and horticulture have the greatest growth potential, and that cassava, pulses and oilseeds will do more to reduce poverty and improve nutrition. By virtue of its size alone, maize has the greatest potential in all three respects. It is argued that a major effort is needed to raise yields in these high-potential sectors.

85. A brief review suggests some weaknesses in the IFPRI analysis. It gives little attention to the non-agricultural sectors. These are growing faster and taken together their share of GDP is two and a half times greater than agriculture. The bigger question is why growth in these sectors is not reducing poverty. Added to this, FAO data does not seem to support the statement that most growth has come from rice, wheat and commercial crops. For example, sorghum output has grown as fast as wheat. As this was on an area 10 times larger, its contribution to growth must also have been 10 times greater. It is also incorrect to imply that the high-growth crops are dominated by commercial farmers. Both dryland rice and cotton are widely grown by smallholders. Most important of all, the emphasis on raising yields – i.e. land productivity – is to overlook Tanzania’s two biggest agricultural assets: abundant land and rapid increases in labour productivity.

86. It is outside the scope of this Study to argue that one or another analysis is correct. It is, however, suggested that it is a mistake to attempt to target ARD investments according to a highly precise set of priorities. More useful is a simple analysis which takes account of the data limitations, and which focuses on Tanzania’s comparative advantage in the different crops. The percentage area of each crop is a good starting point, together with the number of farmers growing it and the amount

<sup>46</sup> FAOStat, <http://faostat.fao.org>

<sup>47</sup> K. Pauw & J. Thurlow - Agricultural Growth, Poverty and Nutrition in Tanzania, IFPRI 2010



of employment it generates. On area alone it is clear that maize is by far the greatest priority. How much to invest in the less preferred crops, such as millet, sorghum and cassava, will need careful judgement. Their importance as a support for the poorest needs to be balanced against their limited potential, both biologically and in the market.

87. Tanzania's agricultural policies are set out in the Agriculture Sector Development Strategy 2001 (ASDS). It aims to strengthen the institutional framework; to create a favourable climate for commercial activities; to clarify public and private roles in support services, including research; and, to improve net farm returns and commercialise agriculture in the longer term. Two quotes from the ASDS underline its recognition of the structure of Tanzania agriculture and the trends outlined above:

*- "The major limitation on the size of land holdings and utilization is the reliance on hand hoes as the main cultivating tool. Efforts to increase agricultural production can include technologies to expand utilized land area or intensification of the existing cultivated area. In the short run the most practical approach is to focus on labour productivity enhancing technologies that are affordable." [Study underline]*

*- "The PRSP Progress Report 2000/01 set extremely ambitious growth targets for the agricultural sector .... However, this was set before a full analysis of the constraints facing the agricultural sector had been completed. In the light of these considerations, a more realistic target for the overall agricultural sector would be average annual rate of growth of 5 per cent p.a. over the 3-year period 2005/07."*

88. The ASDS is being implemented through the Agriculture Sector Development Programme (ASDP). This fully detailed seven-year programme (2006/7 to 2012/13) is costed at TzS 2.49 billion (between US\$ 1.5 and 2.0 billion). Fully integrated with the national poverty reduction strategy and with the donors' Joint Assistance Strategy, ASDP is being implemented as a Sector Wide Approach supported by a donor Basket Fund.<sup>48</sup>

### **3.2.2. The CAADP Process**

89. Consultations for Tanzania' CAADP process started in mid 2008, but the full process started in February 2010, with a five-day joint mission by NEPAD, the PLIs and SADC. This recognised the solid body of work that had already been done 'in compliance with CAADP principles': i.e. the ASDS and ASDP. These had been prepared through a consultative process involving government, the donors and a range of national stakeholders. Further missions involving FAO, IFPRI/ReSAKSS as well as NEPAD, included meetings with the Agricultural Sector Working Group. These led to the establishment of a multi-sectoral Task Force involving all stakeholder groups to do stock-taking and analytical work preparatory to the signature of Tanzania's CAADP Compact.<sup>49</sup>

90. This analytical work was expected to result in the preparation of six CAADP Tanzania Briefs and three CAADP brochures, to be used during the consultation processes. The briefs were on topics such as: Creating an enabling agricultural policy environment; Strategic Investment Priorities for Agricultural Growth and Poverty Reduction; and, Financing Agriculture Sector Development in Tanzania. These briefs, each of which is between four and eight pages long, are published on the ReSAKSS website. It would seem that the brochures may not have been completed.

91. The roundtable process was completed rapidly. Tanzania's Compact was signed on 13 July 2010. Signatories included the Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation as well as the Tanzania and Zanzibar Ministers of Agriculture.<sup>50</sup> The Irish Ambassador signed on

<sup>48</sup> United Republic of Tanzania, Government Programme Document: Agriculture Sector Development Programme – Support through Basket Fund

<sup>49</sup> United Republic of Tanzania, Post Compact Road Map for Tanzania, July 2010

<sup>50</sup> The Tanzania Minister of Fisheries and Livestock Development did not sign





behalf of the donors. Other international signatories included the AU Commission, the East African Community and the SADC Secretariat. For Tanzania's farmers and private sector, representatives of the Federation of Cooperatives, the Private Sector Foundation, the Association of NGOs, the Zanzibar Chamber of Commerce, and the National Business Council also signed.<sup>51</sup>

92. Tanzania's Post Compact Road Map sets out a process for the development of Investment Plans. These are to be formulated with the participation of key stakeholders and then submitted to EAC, SADC and NEPAD where they "will undergo review by AUC/NEPAD, LPs, ECA and SADC, IFPRI, ReSAKSS, and FAO Investment Center." After that Tanzania is to hold Business Meetings to finalise the plans and start to mobilise the necessary resources from the budget and through negotiations with the donors. It was expected that this process would be completed by December 2010. However, in May 2011 the Study team were advised that the Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP) was not ready, but perhaps 'nearing the end' of the process.

### 3.2.3. Assessment of the CAADP Process

93. Apart from one meeting in Dar es Salaam, the Study team received no responses to their requests for stakeholder views on CAADP and donor support to Pillar 4. Despite repeated requests, none of Government, the lead donors on the Agriculture Sector Working Group, the FAO and other focal points responded to the email questionnaire. This assessment depends, therefore, on a review of available documents, in particular a comparison of the CAADP documents and the Programme Document for the 2006-2013 Agriculture Sector Development Programme.

94. The CAADP Compact itself is short, 10 pages, and quite general in terms. Apart from the standard CAADP targets of 6% agricultural growth and 10% of budget funds, there are no specific commitments. The four "Key Stakeholder Endorsements" are just a restatement of commitments to the ASDP, to Paris/Accra, and to the Maputo declaration. The Tanzania Briefs prepared as supporting material for the Compact are not much more specific, especially when compared to the comprehensive ASDP programme document; which sets out eight sub-components with detailed strategies, costings and targets for each one.

95. In effect, the Briefs and the Compact are an acknowledgement that ASDP has been well designed and that the CAADP process cannot contribute much until it comes to its end in 2013. A recent evaluation of ASDP links TAFSIP, the investment plan prepared under the CAADP, to a follow-on ASDP II programme.<sup>52</sup> This seems to be a logical way to integrate CAADP into the existing situation. Nevertheless, it leaves a question about how much real value CAADP can add in a country like Tanzania, where Government and donors are already engaged in a well-established framework for coordination and alignment through an agricultural basket fund and sector wide approach. This engagement is not perfect, as is shown by the fact that some donors withdrew from the ASDP basket fund because they were not willing to fund Government's ambitious irrigation programme.<sup>53</sup> However, CAADP will need to change its approach if it is to help resolve this kind of difficulty. This is a good example of the need for a closer focus on country-level issues.

96. A number of reviews have suggested that CAADP has not contributed to greater ownership in-country. In Tanzania it is difficult to see that the rather short process prior to signing the Compact can have done much in this regard. The only significant consultation at this stage was a six-day meeting of the stocktaking Task Force in a resort near Dar es Salaam. However, ownership of the Investment Plan is more important. For this the Post Compact Road Map sets out plans for country-wide zonal consultations. The Study team were not able to discover how fully these have been implemented. In an interview in Dar es Salaam, donor representatives were uncertain whether any workshops had taken place. They agreed that the in-country process may be under-funded. Overall, there is little indication that CAADP consultations have been equal in scale or approach to the relatively extensive consultations over Tanzania's Poverty Reduction Strategy and the ASDP. The Road Map proposes

<sup>51</sup> The Study has been unable to locate a copy of the signed Compact. This is from a draft dated 8 July 2010

<sup>52</sup> Evaluation of the ASDP, Draft, Submitted to Dir. Policy & Planning, MAFSC, June 2011

<sup>53</sup> Idem



that the Investment Plans be reviewed by NEPAD, two regional organisations, four PLIs, IFPRI/ReSAKSS and FAO: 10 organisations in all. This distinctly bureaucratic approach may be intended to build ownership at the regional and continental levels. The Study team feels it may risk diluting national ownership as a result.

97. Donor representatives in Dar es Salaam advised the Study team that current members of the Agriculture Sector Working Group include USAID, Japan, the EU, the World Bank, Ireland, IFAD, and FAO. Other bilateral donors, including Denmark and the UK, are concentrating on trade and private sector development. (It was not clear whether this also reflected the disagreement mentioned above over Government's irrigation plans.) The ASWG meets every month and holds a consultative meeting with Government twice a year, although it was hoped that it would be four times. It was agreed that the balance could be better with more frequent contact with Government, although donors also meet Government individually. The ASWG concentrates on the ASDP as a SWAP/Basket fund. This represents about a half of total donor aid to agriculture. The Working Group tries to look at wider issues but it has not given much thought to ARD. Overall, it was felt that CAADP has helped to keep discussions on agricultural development moving forward. But there was already a strong in-country push in that direction, most notably through Government's *Kilimo Kwanza*, Agriculture First vision, which was launched in 2009, before the full CAADP process started.

### **3.2.4. ARD Structure and Capacity**

98. ASTI figures show that ARD in Tanzania is significantly better staffed and funded than the other two case study countries. Like Benin, the NARS was supported by a large stand-alone project through the 1990s until 2004: the two-phase Tanzania Agricultural Research Project. There was then a hiatus until the start of the ASDP. Government has recently committed to raise funding further, but ASTI reports that the research departments are still constrained by monthly cash budgeting and funding shortfalls.

99. Under ASDP, Tanzania's strategy emphasises demand-driven research or CORDEMA: Client – Oriented Research Management and Development Approach. This is supported by zonal research centres, with competitive zonal research funds and district development plans. It is taking time to establish this relatively complex framework. The 2011 ASDP evaluation reports that CORDEMA is not yet mainstreamed and that *“The overall guidance and support to strategic research weakened during the ASDP implementation.”* It describes how some research centres have won support from donors, AGRA, ASARECA, etc, while *“At the national level, overall research programme coordination and quality control of strategic research programmes did not benefit from adequate support.”* Overall, user adoption of research and the impact on productivity is described as *“slow and limited.”*<sup>54</sup>

### **3.2.5. Donor Support to CAADP Pillar 4**

100. Tanzania's donor-supported ARD portfolio is listed in Appendix 4. It shows 140 programmes and projects ('projects' in what follows), which have been identified as contributing to ARD in Tanzania. The data has been gathered from a range of sources and it is known that there are gaps and inconsistencies. There may also be duplication, where one project has been given a title in one source and a different title in another. However, it is the best available statement of the current situation.

101. Only 15 projects have a sole focus on Tanzania. The remaining 118 benefit a number of countries. Regional groups include three to eight countries. Other groups are formed around an interest in a particular crop: rice, cassava, etc. There are also much larger groups: 23 countries in SS Africa for example. There are seven Multi-Donor Funds benefiting a number of countries; i.e. programmes which allocate finance to sub-projects implemented by international or national partners, through a challenge process or otherwise.

102. A four-category classification captures the options implicit in the portfolio:

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<sup>54</sup> Evaluation of the ASDP, Draft, Submitted to Dir. Policy & Planning, MAFSC, June 2011



- International programmes which produce results of benefit to Tanzania, but do not involve Tanzanian institutions in the research.
- Regional/Commodity focussed programmes where Tanzanian and other national agencies participate in the research.
- Multi Donor Funds which give Tanzanian institutions access to research finance, usually within parameters set by the Fund, or its managing agency.
- Single-country projects implemented by a Tanzanian institution, usually with an international lead partner.

103. There are 68 projects where no Tanzanian partner institution is named, presumably because they fall into the first category. Only one out of 140 projects is led by a Tanzanian institution: Sokoine University. Of the remainder, Lead Agencies include 11 CGIAR centres, ASARECA, FAO, AVRDC, ICIPE and four European universities/research institutes.

104. 79 of the projects are funded through CGIAR, or a CG group centre acting as lead agency. 23 projects are funded through ASARECA. In at least two cases, a CG centre acts as Lead Agency for ASARECA. Other funding channels include the World Bank, FAO, AATF, and AECF.

105. About half the projects (56) have a crop focus. In most cases, the Lead Agency is the CG centre holding the mandate for the crop: CIMMYT for maize, ICRISAT for legumes, etc. For some crops the number of projects is misleading because several projects are grouped around one relatively narrow issue. Banana is the clearest example, with four of eight projects focussed on *Xanthosoma* Wilt and two on tissue culture. This is partly because different funding streams are treated as separate projects, even when used for the same work. On tissue culture two CG agencies seem to be sharing the lead role and listing their work as a separate project. The distribution by crop/topic is as follows:

Crops

Maize	10	Cassava	11	
Banana	8	Rice	9	
Sweet Potato	3	Sorghum/Millet	5	
Legumes	4	Others	6	Coffee, Coconut, Mango, Cashew, Fibre, Tomato

Other Topics

NRM	18	Climate Change	8
Pest control	12 (including 4 for <i>Striga</i> )		
ARD Policy	8	Markets	4

106. There are only three livestock projects, one for livestock, one for milk and one for fodder; and only three irrigation projects, all led by IWMI. Other topics include biodiversity (1 project), biofuel (1), biotechnology (2), food safety (1), agricultural statistics (2) and Quality Protein grain and roots (2).

107. Tanzanian institutions named as research implementers included: Sokoine University (13 projects), MARI (9), SARI (8), ARI (7), MAFSC/DRD (6), LZARDI (5), and ARDI (4). Non-NARS institutions included the Diocese of Central Tanganyika, Singida DC, University of Dar Es Salaam and private sector seed companies. For 10 projects the listing only shows the Tanzania NARS as a partner, presumably indicating a relatively low level of participation. For a large majority of projects the Tanzanian institute was only one of many developing and developed country organisations listed as a partner in the research. In extreme cases over 30 partners are listed.

108. There are no details of how project funding is allocated between the lead agency and its research partners. Given the moderate size of the overall budgets and the large numbers of countries covered and research partners involved, it seems unlikely that more than a handful of these projects, if



any, provide substantial funding to the Tanzanian institute which is participating. For many, it would appear that Tanzanian participation may be nominal. For most of the rest it seems likely that funding is only enough for a small, narrowly focussed piece of research.

### 3.2.6. Tanzania Overview

109. There are a number of similarities between Benin and Tanzania. In both of them donor support to ARD is dominated by multi-country projects supported through CGIAR and the SROs. In both of them focussed efforts to strengthen the NARS during the 1990s and early 2000s have come to an end, and not been directly replaced. In Tanzania, this is being replaced by significant and growing support through the ASDP, but NARS capacity is still weak and described as ‘underfunded’.

## 3.3. Zambia

### 3.3.1. The Agricultural Economy

110. Zambia is significantly different from Benin and especially Tanzania. Per capita GNI is nearly double that of Tanzania and Agricultural GDP is nearly a third lower as a proportion: 21.6% of Total GDP versus 29.7%. (See Table 2) Agricultural growth is also much lower than in the other two countries. Between 1999 and 2009 the average was only as high as 1.35% because of a very sharp increase (12%) in 2009. As a whole the decade saw as many falls in agricultural GDP as it did increases. Average rates had been higher in the 1980s (3.5%) and 1990s (5.1%). Slow growth in agriculture was offset by rapid growth, around 8% per annum in all other sectors, and the economy as a whole averaged 5.2% between 1999 and 2000.<sup>55</sup>

111. Slow agricultural growth in Zambia can be partly explained by macro-economic factors. Higher incomes, a smaller agricultural share of the economy, and a relatively strong exchange rate resulting from exports of copper and other minerals would all be expected to slow the growth of the agricultural sector. During the 1990s less than 5% of the national budget was allocated to agriculture. This increased to 8% in 2005 and 2006, before dropping back to 4% in 2007.

112. The ReSAKSS analysis in 2008<sup>56</sup> found that Zambia was not on track to achieve the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG1) of halving poverty and hunger by 2015 even with a CAADP target AgDP growth rate of 6%. To achieve the MDG1 poverty and hunger targets (2015) the sector would have had to grow at between 8% and 11% which implied a massive increase in agricultural spending: between 28% and 47% pa.<sup>57</sup> Even to hit the CAADP 6% target, spending increases of between 17% and 27% pa would be needed. They depend on a wide range of assumptions about achievable yields, growth rates in the non-agricultural sectors, and the likely efficiency of public spending on agriculture.

113. To take two examples, in the ‘CAADP scenario’ the Zambia model assumes that yields will grow by 3.5% per annum continuously for 10 years, and sorghum yields by 4.0%. Respectively, these are five and 21 times the ‘Baseline Scenario’ figures, i.e. what is expected to happen without the support of CAADP. The width of the estimated range indicates the uncertainty of the assumptions about efficiency. Besides which the idea that agriculture might absorb a quarter of all budgetary resources seems quite unrealistic. As elsewhere, the Study team would question whether these estimates are useful for forming policy or deciding budget allocations to agriculture.

### 3.3.2. Assessment of CAADP Process

114. Zambia was one of the first countries to engage with the ‘Roundtable’ process. The stocktaking exercise and an analysis of the country’s agricultural growth and investment options were completed in early 2008. A stakeholder consultation workshop was also held. However, the Country Compact was only signed in January 2011. In addition to political uncertainties, this delay appears to have

<sup>55</sup> Calculated from data given in FAO CountryStat

<sup>56</sup> - <http://www.resakss.org/index.php?pdf=39389>

<sup>57</sup> - <http://www.resakss.org/index.php?pdf=45141>



been partly related to weaknesses in the in-country process and method, particularly with consultation<sup>58</sup> and participation. There is no documentation from the Zambian CAADP process available on the ReSAKSS website and an internet search failed to locate any. On the CAADP website<sup>59</sup>, Zambia is one of the countries with the least documentation – just an unsigned compact. This may indicate that the Zambian process has not been pursued very energetically.

115. Despite that, the four Zambian responses to this Study's SSQ provide evidence of an improved implementation process, leading up to the Zambian Compact signing in January 2011. This was reflected in the integration of CAADP with the development of the sixth national development plan (SNDP), which included widespread contributions from actors across government, civil society, NGO and private sectors, and donors. Donor involvement in the CAADP process was assisted by efforts since 2003 to improve aid effectiveness. These took the form of a Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ), developed between the Zambian government and its DPs, and its implementation through sector-based Cooperating Partners Groups<sup>60</sup> (see also para. 118).

116. The fifth and sixth National Development Plans (FNDP/SNDP) were compared to look for evidence that CAADP has influenced national policy on ARD. Little such evidence was found that ARD was given higher priority in the SNDP. The term 'agricultural research' is only mentioned once in either plan, apart from the title of the Zambian Agricultural Research Institute. Both plans allocate funds to a Research and Development programme which is common to all sectors, not just agriculture. Agriculture as a whole was given greater priority: up from 6.6% of FNDP to 10.7% of SNDP. However, the later plan was smaller, so this was not as big an increase as it might seem.

117. Zambia's Country Compact contained the same non-specific commitments as Tanzania's. In the common format, it presents a set of 'key endorsements', in summary that Government, the donors, the AU and other African institutions will fulfil the commitments they have made in various other documents: the development plans, the joint assistance strategy, the Maputo declaration etc. As far as can be discovered, no progress has been made since signing the Compact with preparing an Agricultural Investment Plan.

118. Donor support to agriculture in Zambia is based on the Joint Assistance Strategy to Zambia (JASZ)<sup>61</sup>, which 16 donor agencies agreed with Government in 2007. The strategy aims to strengthen country ownership, enhance development effectiveness and reduce the administrative costs, by using country systems. As is now standard, donors are encouraged to reduce the number of sectors each one is involved in.<sup>62</sup> The strategy works in the framework of Zambia's national development plans.

119. The Agriculture Sector Working Group (known as the Agricultural Cooperating Partners Group- AgCPG) is led by AfDB, EU and USAID. Active members include Finland, Japan, Sweden, the World Bank and the UN. Norway is a background member, and DFID has observer status. The Netherlands has phased out assistance to agriculture. The JASZ is presented as a leading example of donor cooperation.<sup>63</sup> The Study asked all AgCPG members to respond to the SSQ, but only four replied. The balance of the assessments provided are positive: including comments on the AgCDP's involvement in the in-country CAADP progress facilitated by a donor-funded project (see para. 128).

### **3.3.3. ARD Structure and Capacity**

120. Public ARD spending and research capacity in Zambia since the 1980s has been on a variable but downward trend. At US\$ 8.1 million, spending in 2008 was around 20% of the 1991 level. As

<sup>58</sup> - [http://www.agricultureandfoodfordevelopment.org/CAADP\\_141008.pdf](http://www.agricultureandfoodfordevelopment.org/CAADP_141008.pdf)

<sup>59</sup> - [www.caadp.net/library-country-status-updates.php](http://www.caadp.net/library-country-status-updates.php)

<sup>60</sup> - <http://www.amblusaka.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/3E0FBA71-A8C8-43C4-B858-8D6C4611759D/0/Zambiafaktablad.pdf>

<sup>61</sup> - <http://www.netherlandsembassy.org.zm/downloads/Joint%20Assistance%20Strategy%20Zambia%20Final%20Ver.pdf>

<sup>62</sup> - <http://www.netherlandsembassy.org.zm/downloads/Annex%201.2%20JASZ%20Annex%203%20Division%20of%20Labour.pdf>

<sup>63</sup> - <http://www.amblusaka.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/3E0FBA71-A8C8-43C4-B858-8D6C4611759D/0/Zambiafaktablad.pdf>



shown in Table 2, the Zambian NARS is understaffed compared to Tanzania and underfunded relative to both the other countries. Total public agricultural R&D spending was quoted at ca 0.3% of agricultural GDP (AgDP) in 2008, down from 0.5% in 2001.

121. The Zambian Agricultural Research Institute (ZARI) accounts for ca 60% of ARD staff capacity and 40% of expenditure. As for Benin, capacity fell during a recruitment freeze between 2002 and 2007. Although numbers have increased since, this is mainly at junior levels. Five other government agencies account for 15% of national ARD capacity and 20% of spending. Two non-profit (but public) agencies account for 8% of capacity and 20% of spending in 2008. One of these the Golden Valley Agricultural Research Trust (GART) doubled its research capacity between 2001 and 2008. The other agency is the Cotton Development Trust. Six higher education agencies and three private agencies make up the balance of national ARD capacity.

122. Data is poor but it seems that Government ARD agencies depend on public funds for salaries and overheads and on donor funds for operating and capital costs. The latter have declined substantially. In 2008 they were at a third of their 2001 level. In 2009 it was estimated that AfDB, WB and the EU contributed 75% of donor funds for ARD.

123. As in other countries attempts have been made to reform research institutions in Zambia. ZARI was created in 2005, as a department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, but with the aim of becoming a sustainable autonomous institution, able to attract its own funding. It did not achieve this. A separate Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development administers livestock and fisheries research. Legislation was passed to centralise agricultural research under the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). This did not go to plan. Line ministries have retained responsibility for implementation; NSTC focuses on the regulation of science and technology.

124. In 2008, 59% of Zambian researchers were working on crops, 15% on livestock, 6% forestry, 4% with fisheries and 3% with natural resources. In 2000, crop research had slightly less priority, at 50%, and natural resources slightly more: 11%. Box 2 presents ASTI's overview of key trends in ARD in Zambia.

#### Box 2 Key trends in ARD in Zambia

- There has been a long-term decline in public investment in agricultural R&D in Zambia due to weakened government and donor support.
- A public sector hiring freeze and lack of training opportunities has led to significant erosion of research staff capacity.
- Spending is mainly allocated to salaries and overheads and ZARI and the other government research agencies have difficulty in supporting research operating and capital costs.
- Years of underinvestment also mean that other needs, such as infrastructure, laboratory equipment, communication facilities, and vehicles hinder research effort.
- Although GART has been successful in generating funding through the sales of goods and services, as well as attracting donor funding and strengthening linkages with UNZA, other trusts within the non-profit sector have not fared as well.
- The trusts were created for the purpose of increasing the flexibility and efficiency of research funding and management. However, they are still dependent on national government funding and the expectations of this policy have not been met.

### 3.3.4. Donor Support for ARD/ Pillar 4

125. Zambia's 2009-on donor supported ARD portfolio is listed in Appendix 4. This section summarises the contribution of individual donors.

126. The AfDB is currently a lead member of the AgCPG in Zambia. The AfDB operation's database does not list any current agriculture-related projects for Zambia although the AfDB funds FARA's *DONATA* and *RAILS* projects for which Zambia is a partner country.



127. None of the EU agriculture and food security sector projects in Zambia were sufficiently Pillar 4 relevant or CAADP related to be included in the Study project database. However, the EU Platform for African – European Partnership in Agricultural Research for Development (PAEPARD) is supporting PELUM (Participatory Ecological Land Use Management) a network of African CSOs based in Zambia and another EU programme supports WAHARA (Water Harvesting for Rainfed Africa), a programme led by European institutions in which the Zambian Golden Valley Agricultural Trust is a participant, along with Tunisian, Ethiopian and Burkinabe organisations. The EU also funds the ICART and FIRCOP projects implemented by SADC-FANR, as described below. An EU-funded programme to support the Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock (a Performance Enhancement Project) has been developed, some of which may be funded by other donors. However, it is not clear what ARD content this may have.

128. **USAID, SIDA and BMGF** are funding *The Food Security Research Project*.<sup>64</sup> This is a collaborative partnership between Zambian the Agricultural Consultative Forum and the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. Michigan State University is the coordinating partner. The focus is on agricultural policy analysis. FRSP has facilitated recent phases of the CAADP process. Unfortunately none of FSRP, ACF or USAID-Zambia responded to the Study SSQ.

129. **Finland**'s currently supports the *Luapula Agricultural and Rural Development Project* (PLARD Phase I & II, 2006-2011), core support to Zambia National Farmers' Union (ZNFU, 2009-2013) and the *Small-scale Irrigation Project* (2009-2010). None of these is projects is explicitly CAADP, or Pillar 4, -related.

130. **Japan** supports ARD via the *Food Crop Diversification Support Project for the Enhancement of Food Security*,<sup>65</sup> implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture and ZARI. It includes an agriculture and rural development adviser<sup>66</sup> in the Ministry's Policy and Planning Department. Limited details of four other JICA agriculture projects seem to show they are not related to Pillar 4.<sup>67</sup> They are not included in the Study database.

131. **Sweden**'s support to agriculture is concentrated on improving the living conditions of small-scale farmers. There seems to be little ARD content in this programme. It also supports FSRP mentioned above.

132. The **World Bank** funded *Agriculture Development Support Programme (ADSP)*<sup>68</sup> is listed by ZARI as a donor-funded project. However, the WB project description allocates only 11% of funds to 'agriculture extension and research', and none of the project components are ARD specific. Neither a recently approved *Irrigation Development and Support Project* nor a 'pipeline' *Livestock Development and Animal Health Project* appear to have Pillar 4 content.

133. **FAO** has 17 active projects in Zambia. Many of these are sub-regional or multi-country projects. Two of these, *Support to the implementation process of the NEPAD CAADP* (2010-13) and *CountrySTAT for Sub-Saharan Africa* (2007-2100) are included on the Study database, as they were for Benin and Tanzania. A third project the *Conservation Agriculture Scaling Up for Increased Productivity and Production*, funded by **Norway**, is Zambia specific.<sup>69</sup>

134. Other stakeholders reported that FAO is directly involved in both the CAADP process and the ASWG. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the FAO representative in Zambia (as in Benin and Tanzania) did not respond to the Study SSQ.

135. **Canada** and **Switzerland** joint fund the *Pan-African Bean Research Alliance* coordinated by CIAT, and **Syngenta** funds the *Insect Resistant Maize for Africa* project implemented by CIMMYT.

<sup>64</sup> - <http://www.aec.msu.edu/fs2/zambia/index.htm>

<sup>65</sup> - <http://www.jica.go.jp/zambia/english/activities/details04.html>

<sup>66</sup> - <http://www.jica.go.jp/zambia/english/activities/details01.html>

<sup>67</sup> - <http://www.jica.go.jp/zambia/english/activities/activity01.html>

<sup>68</sup> - <http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P070063>

<sup>69</sup> - [http://www.norway.org.zm/Embassy/norwayzambia/Norwegian\\_Development\\_Co\\_operation/](http://www.norway.org.zm/Embassy/norwayzambia/Norwegian_Development_Co_operation/)



Zambia is a partner both of these multi-country projects. Similarly Zambia also benefits under various programmes managed by FARA: *UniBRAIN* (Denmark funded); *SCARDA* (United Kingdom); *DONATA* and *RAILS* (both AfDB).

136. **AGRA's** Program for Africa's Seeds Systems is working in Zambia, but it is not directly related to Pillar 4.<sup>70</sup> A Zambian ARD information network, the ZAR4DIN Blogspot,<sup>71</sup> lists three other AGRA projects in ZARI's portfolio which are Pillar 4-relevant, but these do not appear in AGRA Grant listings.

137. **CGIAR** has 30 projects operating in Zambia. 12 different CGIAR centres are involved as 'lead centre'. IFPRI, CIMMYT and IWMI are the most frequent (6, 5 and 5 projects respectively). This reflects IFPRI's involvement with CAADP, and CIMMYT's leadership on maize, the most important Zambian crop. Some 37 SSA countries are involved as implementing countries on these CGIAR projects. Apart from Ethiopia, the more frequent are from the sub-region: Mozambique (24 projects), Malawi (22), Tanzania (19), Uganda (18), Kenya (17) and Zimbabwe (13). This suggests some geographical focus, although CGIAR projects are disproportionately concentrated in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia. With 14 crop projects, the portfolio is strongly oriented towards crop-agriculture. Other topics include Water (5), Forestry/Agro-forestry (3), Livestock (2), Fish (2), Policy and Institutions (2) and Socio-Economics (2). As noted for Benin and Tanzania, it is believed that CGIAR project resources are thinly spread amongst numerous collaborating countries and implementing partners.

138. Zambia is a member of both COMESA and SADC can access funding from both ASARECA and SADC. The Agricultural and Natural Resources Research and Development Unit at **SADC-FANR**<sup>72</sup> has two projects that may fund ARD in Zambia: the *Implementation and Coordination of Agricultural Research and Training Project* (EU-funded)<sup>73</sup> and the *Fund for Innovative and Regional Collaborative Projects*. Both seem to be competitive grant funds, but information on the SADC-FANR website is outdated or 'under construction'. As at 2008, the first of the two projects had supported seven projects focussed on ARD and capacity building. However, it is noted that all seven projects listed were led by non-SADC national organisations: namely Natural Resources Institute, UK (4 projects), CABI (1), ICRISAT (1) and World Vision (1). Unfortunately, SADC-FANR did not respond to the Study's questionnaire and the Study could not obtain access to a recent EU review of ICART.

### 3.3.5. Zambia overview

139. In Zambia, current ARD activity and its support appears weak and fractured. Allowing for the problems in obtaining information from Zambia the Study suggests that the distinguishing feature of the Zambia case study is that the current status of ARD in Zambia reflects failed attempts (probably for primarily policy and funding reasons) to reform the ARD system in Zambia. This outcome provides a salutary lesson in the dangers of not ensuring that a reform process is adequately designed, resourced and managed to bring it to a successful conclusion.

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<sup>70</sup> - <http://www.agra-alliance.org/Map/Zambia.pdf>

<sup>71</sup> - <http://zar4din.blogspot.com/>

<sup>72</sup> - <http://www.sadc.int/fanr/agricresearch/index.php>

<sup>73</sup> - <http://www.sadc.int/fanr/agricresearch/icart/index.php>





## 4. Questionnaire Responses on Effectiveness of Aid to Agriculture

140. The poor responses to the Study’s Semi Structured Questionnaire has already been noted (para. 17) and this must be borne in mind when reading this section. This evidence needs to be interpreted with caution due to the low number of responses (16) although the low numbers are partly offset by the diversity of respondents and the completeness of the individual responses.<sup>74</sup>

### 4.1. Achievement of the Paris Declaration Principles

141. Table 3 sets out the responses to the question: “Give your overall assessment to which the [e.g. Ownership] principle is being achieved through donor support to the CAADP process.” Ownership achievements were the most positively assessed. Although there were no wholly negative responses, a majority felt that Alignment and Harmonisation had only been achieved to ‘some extent.’

Table 3 Achievement of Paris Declaration principles through donor support to CAADP Pillar 4

	Responses by Achievement Level			
	To a large extent	To some extent	No effect	Discouraged
Ownership	6	6	0	0
Alignment	3	8	1	0
Harmonisation	3	8	1	0

### 4.2. Ownership

142. Under each heading, respondents were asked to identify strengths and weaknesses. The following Ownership Strengths were reported:

- The CAADP Process results in diverse and more representative, stakeholder participation, leading to improved outcomes (i.e. projects) better designed around stakeholder needs.
- Develops a stronger joint vision and commitment between governments and donors.
- Encourages linkage between national and regional level needs and investment plans.

143. Funding and Capacity Building were seen as the major Ownership Weaknesses. Although pooled funds are expected to create greater ownership and legitimacy than projects, MDTFs are reported as discouraging ownership when their funding procedures are counterproductive or result in ‘local decisions’ being frustrated. Lack of targeted support for capacity building is identified as a negative factor for ownership and a risk to delivering effective development assistance outcomes.

144. Respondents identified five ways to improve ownership, three related to ARD and two to CAADP in general. For ARD the key points are that:

- The NARS need support so they have the support and authority needed to play an effective role.
- Capacity development is required to enable NARS and other ARD actors to contribute to the CAADP process and to wider policies, not just as researchers but as leaders and facilitators of the country’s agricultural development process.
- For donors to help ensure effective CAADP consultation, they must insist on cost-sharing mechanisms to stimulate country-ownership and reduce donor-dependence. Consultation

<sup>74</sup> - WB – 1; EU – 2; NEPAD – 1; Bilateral Donors – 3; National Govt – 1; SROs – 2; RECs – 1; FARA – 6.



should use African expertise and resources, so as to reinforce their capacity development, and the ‘Africanness’ of the CAADP initiative.

### **4.3. Alignment**

145. Issues of ‘funding’ and ‘process’ dominate responses on Alignment. A Strength of the CAADP process is that it is a vehicle for the improved alignment of donor funding and well as delivering improved, and better aligned, funding outcomes. Pooled funding arrangements, including competitive elements, are also seen as a Strength, particularly those that are regionally-based (e.g. AGRA), since they respond to the evolving needs of the CAADP process (e.g. the GAFSP). Donors’ involvement in the CAADP process means that the resulting national investment plans are more likely to build-in donor support and commitment from their early stages.

146. Weaknesses in donor alignment on funding reflect those cited under Ownership for both bi-lateral and multi-lateral funding: i.e. donor conditionality or procedures and process, beyond those needed to manage fiduciary risk and ensure transparent use and financial accountability, which reduce the accessibility of funds. The poor alignment of the ‘international research centres’ with (by implication) regional and national needs was also identified as a Weakness.

147. As for Ownership, lessons to build on Strengths and to minimise Weaknesses for funding are primarily a question of improving Alignment or rectifying a procedure. A lesson specific to Alignment is the need for a common understanding of Alignment amongst the relevant actors and what needs to be done to achieve it. Significantly the responses widen the topic of Alignment to cover the CAADP process itself and to identify the need for improved integration and alignment of the inter-CAADP pillar process, i.e. inter-pillar working.

### **4.4. Harmonisation**

148. Issues of ‘funding’ and ‘process’ also dominate responses on Harmonisation. For funding again pooled funding arrangements, whether the WB managed multilateral funds (e.g. MDTFs, the Child Trust Funds or APPs) or where bi-lateral donors combine funding (e.g. for the CAADP process stimulated PEP in Zambia or a FARA NSP), are Strengths. Effective operation of ASWGs (e.g. the AgCPG in Zambia) are identified as a Strength.

149. For Harmonisation all the Weaknesses and Lessons for improvement concern funding. Multiple examples of Weaknesses are those factors (e.g. cumbersome procedures, donor interests, lack of uptake on donor coordination initiatives) that work against Harmonisation. The most common are those that work against the effective implementation of the pooled funding arrangements (e.g. MDTFs) that are otherwise regarded as Strengths.

150. Lessons for improving Harmonisation are straightforward: viz. rectifying conflicting procedures through an audit and revision of problematic procedures, speeding up the process of donor harmonisation, capacity building for partners on fund access procedures, better targeting of funding against nationally identified priorities and development of a minimum and common (donor) funding conditions and procedures to reduce their complexity and diversity for fund users.



## **5. Assessment of Donor Support to ARD**

151. The Phase 2 ToR ask the Study to identify areas where donor support to CAADP Pillar 4 is well coordinated and effective, and contrast them with areas where it is not. The factors behind the differences are to be analysed and opportunities for improvement identified. The three Case Studies have shown that a different approach will be more effective. There was a high degree of similarity across all three countries. No outstanding ‘self-contained’ examples of good or bad practice were identified. Instead, the case studies have shown a number of significant issues which are common to CAADP, and to agricultural development across the board. The Study’s central findings are derived from an examination of these issues and their implications for donor support to ARD in SSA.

152. This section aims to do two things. First it presents what can be described as the current ‘standard framework’ of donor support to ARD: there are variations on this framework but its essential features are clear. The structure and operation of this framework that affect its relevance and effectiveness are then examined to provide ideas for improvement. Second, it briefly examines the strategy for agricultural development which underlies current donor support to the sector; again to identify scope for improvement. This strategy is more implicit than explicit but still has a large influence on the form and extent of action appropriate to support CAADP and ARD in SSA.

153. The final sub-section discusses the evolution of coordination of donor support to ARD and identifies the Study’s central concern with the current strategy for this support; namely the imbalance in form and scale of support between the international, regional and country levels. This imbalance has negative implications for effectiveness of donor support to ARD and of CAADP. Opportunities to address this imbalance and its consequences are discussed in the report’s final section which also consolidates the findings from both of the Study’s phases.

### **5.1. A Standard Framework of Donor Support to ARD**

154. When CAADP started in 2002, the development partners were just beginning major reforms to bring aid architectures into line with the Paris Declaration Principles. By the time CAADP became fully effective, around 2005, many of those reforms were complete. Most African countries already had arrangements for donor coordination through sector working groups, and for structured discussions with Government. For greater coordination and alignment, development partners were aiming to put the majority of their funds into sectoral basket funds, or through direct budget support. In many countries, including Tanzania and Zambia, these policies are structured as a Joint Assistance Strategy. During this period African countries were developing detailed Poverty Reduction Strategies to meet the MDGs. Donors made a commitment to align their development aid programmes with those strategies. Another significant development has been the widespread adoption of ‘medium term budgeting’ to provide greater control over public expenditures.

155. The case studies have shown that these reforms extended to the agriculture sector. In each of Benin, Tanzania and Zambia, new agricultural development strategies and plans were drafted. Some, like the Tanzania ASDP, were highly detailed and provided donors with the framework for a basket fund/Sector Wide Approach, through which to coordinate their support to the sector. In this context, CAADP came into effect rather late. It has perhaps struggled to find a clear role, one through which it could add value to processes which were already well underway. In more than one country, some saw CAADP as duplicating work that had already been done.

156. CAADP may have had most impact over funding, through the well publicised commitment to spend 10% of Government budgets on agriculture. This helped to reinforce Governments’ commitment to agriculture, and it made the case for extra funding to the sector. However, the analysis to support that case has been theoretical, even mechanical, and quite narrow. No attempt has been made, for example, to see how the 10% budget target might, or might not, be realistic in terms of the different countries’ Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks. In countries with well-developed plans for the agriculture sector, strong budget procedures and many competing political pressures, it is not clear that the CAADP target has had a significant impact on the level of funding to agriculture.



157. Development aid still falls short of the Paris Declaration principles of ownership, harmonisation and alignment in many respects. There are even signs of what might be termed ‘Paris Fatigue’, with donors pulling back from direct budget support and similar mechanisms. A substantial proportion of donor funds is spent outside the agreed coordination and alignment frameworks. Despite its potential to do so, the Study did not find strong evidence that the CAADP process has contributed to maintaining progress towards the Paris Declaration principles. There is even a risk that it has created an impression of progress, and so allowed underlying issues to be ignored.

158. CAADP has introduced a number of new continental and regional actors: NEPAD, the RECs, the PLIs and the SROs. While their activity varies with country and support level, this has increased the number of organisations a national ministry of agriculture has to deal with. What used to be a two-way dialogue between Government and donor representatives in-country has now acquired, through the involvement of NEPAD and others an additional (CAADP) dimension. The Study was not able to identify evidence that this extra dimension has added value to the formulation and implementation of agricultural development policy.

## **5.2. Donor Support to Pillar 4**

159. The Study’s mapping of country portfolios of donor-funded ARD presented in Appendix 4 is informative but imperfect. Even for the three case study countries, there are known to be significant gaps and it still not possible to estimate the level of funding going to a given country in a given year. However, when taken together with other material on ARD the portfolios do allow a good understanding of the current framework of donor support to ARD within which country systems have to operate. This pattern was outlined in Phase 1, and is confirmed by the Phase 2 Case Studies. The pattern’s key features are discussed in the following subsections.

### **5.2.1. Funding Channels**

160. The majority of donor funds for ARD are now channelled through international, continental or regional intermediary organisations. Projects coordinated by the CGIAR centres are the most numerous. Almost all of these are implemented with partner institutions spread across many countries, within and outside the SSA. Collectively CGIAR absorbs the majority of donor-funding for ARD in SSA (see the Phase 1 Report). However, the resources are spread across so many countries and implementing partners that the contribution to a single country’s ARD effort may be limited. CGIAR is in a process of reform, but ongoing research is predominantly organised as before: by production and resource system. Crop-oriented projects are the most frequent with livestock, policy, socio-economics and other topics being poorly represented.

161. Across SSA, the distribution of CGIAR projects is skewed in favour of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia. Many CG projects are regionally focussed or, less frequently, on a small number of countries. This is more common where projects have ‘restricted’ (i.e. bilateral) funding. This regional pattern reflects the (re)distribution of CGIAR effort into regional offices/ sub-centres and a move from providing international to regional and sub-regional research public goods.

162. After CGIAR, the next largest category of ARD projects are channelled through the SROs. SROs are well-funded, through their MDTFs and World Bank Agricultural Productivity Programmes. Their mandates, strategies and management are explicitly sub-regional. Their portfolios are smaller in number than CGIAR but they are likely to contribute a greater proportion of their funding to individual countries. Nevertheless, the portfolios reflect the same crop-orientation and cross-country distribution as CGIAR. A substantial proportion of SRO support is via competitive channels, or as commissions, against the SRO strategic criteria. As for CGIAR projects, this support mode risks fragmenting country-level ARD portfolios and distorting country research agendas.

### **5.2.2. Support to National ARD Capacity**

163. During the 1990s and early 2000s, donors provided substantial support to national ARD. A relatively standard model promoted demand-led research by semi-autonomous, self-financing research institutes. These reforms were partially successful, at best, and donor support has now been



largely withdrawn. Dedicated support to country-level ARD is now limited to a few bilateral donors and regional funds (e.g. AGRA). This is usually in the context of relatively narrow, single-issue topics such as climate change. There is wider donor support for agricultural development projects. Typically these are implemented through NGO, producer-based and private sector providers, sometimes with a quasi-ARD function. There seem to be few links with the NARS but they may benefit indirectly where donor funded projects interface with country ARD systems.

164. National ARD systems do benefit from budget support and basket funding under donor-supported sector strategies, such as Tanzania’s Agricultural Sector Development Programme. Time and resources did not allow the Study to estimate the level of this funding independently. ASTI and GCARD provide the best available proxy for this information. ASTI’s recent assessment of country-level funding for public ARD systems<sup>75</sup> leads to the conclusion that the level of donor support for ARD within these channels is small and does not significantly influence ARD capacity. For example, ASTI reports that although *“investments and human resource capacity in public ARD averaged more than 20 percent growth in SSA during 2001–2008, this occurred in only a handful of countries and was largely the result of increased government commitments to augment incommensurately low salary levels and to rehabilitate neglected infrastructure, often after years of underinvestment. Many countries—particularly those in francophone West Africa, which are threatened by extremely fragile funding systems—face fundamental capacity and investment challenges.”*

165. Individual country reports confirm these overall assessments. Tanzania’s ASDP, for example, allocates just 3.8% of the total budget to ‘Research and Training’; approximately \$10 million a year, of which two-thirds is to be funded by donors. The assessment from a recent evaluation shown in the Box 3 summarises the relatively limited results. On this evidence it would seem that NARS resourcing is poor, even declining, and that the complex and imperfectly absorbed structures of ‘demand-led’, ‘client-oriented’ research have contributed to a lack of strategic direction.

Box 3 Selected findings from Tanzania ASDP, Draft, MAFSC, June 2011

ASDP supported a wide range of reforms for agricultural research and extension underscoring farmer-driven services, ... While the principle of village plans .... and farmer control of research priorities is accepted, the practice is mixed as the shift from the past requires major institutional and attitude change. Research outputs have been recorded but the impact on user adoption and productivity gains remains limited. .... Research-extension linkages have been strengthened but under-funding has limited achievements, especially for longer-term, strategic research and improved communications.

Evaluation of the ASDP, Draft, MAFSC, June 2011

166. In summary, donors have ceased to provide strategic support to the development of national ARD capacities. Some ARD capacity development is provided, for example through FARA’s *UniBRAIN* fund, but little work is now being done in-country to develop the NARS as a system. Despite some good initiatives, combined and coordinated support does not reach the critical mass needed to help the systems absorb the quite radical changes which were introduced in order to promote a more demand-led approach to ARD. Since a well functioning country ARD system is fundamental to CAADP Pillar 4, the Study team believes this lack of ARD capacity to be a major weakness, potentially the single most important factor which will prevent CAADP meeting its ARD objectives.

167. It must be stressed that Ownership is impossible without national specialists with the skill and experience to take on responsibility for the work. Similarly, Alignment is impossible if there is no national capacity to devise policies for donors to align with. This is not to overlook the fact that previous efforts to support the development of the NARS have been largely unsuccessful. Instead it is to stress that those efforts need to be continued, and improved, despite risk of slow progress.

<sup>75</sup> - <http://www.ifpri.org/publication/african-agricultural-rd-new-millennium>



168. In contrast to CAADP's headline target of 10% to agricultural investment, no specific goals are set for Pillar 4. Some sources suggest that 1% of agricultural GDP would be an appropriate level. The FAAP mentions 1.5%. There certainly seems to be a case for increased funding to the NARS, but the Study team emphasises that capacity, management and technical quality are much bigger issues than funding *per se*. Without those key factors, there is a risk of repeating earlier, unsuccessful efforts to strengthen national ARD systems, or of falling back into a 'business as usual' approach.

### 5.2.3. Alignment with National Needs and Policies

169. The agro-ecologies and farming systems of SSA countries are well understood. In most countries, the ARD system is structured around this understanding, as in the Tanzanian system of zonal research institutes. These national characteristics do not seem to be reflected in the donor-supported portfolio. Instead, it is dominated by research into issues which are believed to have relevance across very large areas: Insect Resistant Maize for Africa is an example. The portfolio is heavily oriented towards crops, and livestock is poorly represented. Two of the three case study countries have made mechanisation a key part of their agricultural development strategies, yet the portfolio includes no work on mechanisation at all. On the evidence available to the Study, donor-supported ARD portfolios do not present a balanced mix of projects that is likely to represent country-level needs.

### 5.2.4. Competitive Research Funds

170. Whether it is the international Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme, the regional East Africa Agriculture Productivity Programme managed by ASARECA, or Tanzania's Zonal Agriculture and Livestock Research and Development Fund, competitive grant funds have become the standard model for allocating finance to agricultural research. The advantages and disadvantages of this model have been well understood since the 1990s. In theory, competition ensures that research is demand-led and that funds only go to the best researchers. In practice, the extent to which they are demand-led depends on the fund manager's ability to identify the right priority areas for funding, and the research can only be as good as the available capacity.

171. A 1999 review summed this up: "*Where there is sufficient AR&D capacity in-country to constitute an effective market, a competitive fund can stimulate competition and enhance efficiency. Where there is not, it is better for donors to concentrate on building up this capacity through institutional development across all sectors, not just in the public sector as in the past.*"<sup>76</sup> Compared to a block grant, competitive funds are expensive to operate, especially the smaller ones, and critically dependent on the fund manager's capacity to manage the performance of the research contractors.

172. Country-level ARD providers have become dependent on competitive funds for much of their operational and research funding. These providers have low capacity, which weakens their ability to submit competitive bids. The bidding process itself imposes costs. Without core funding to support their overall operation, research institutes struggle to submit effective bids. The result is that a few, capable national institutes, such as Sokoine University in Tanzania and the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute are quite successful, but the majority struggle. The EU funded Platform for African-European Partnership on Agricultural Research for Development (PAEPARD) has highlighted the difficulties. Out of over a hundred bids to its competitive fund, only a few were good enough to fund and African involvement in those bids was '*quite limited*'. Among other issues, it is striking that PAEPARD reports that few of the research themes were relevant to Africa: a fundamental failing for a fund of this kind.<sup>77</sup> It is worth noting once again that Benin's bid to GAFSP was unsuccessful,<sup>78</sup> and only five of twelve successful bidders to the fund come from SSA.

<sup>76</sup> ODI NR Perspective Paper No 41, Competitive Agricultural Technology Funds in Developing Countries,

<sup>77</sup> - <http://farastaff.blogspot.com/2011/05/paepards-contribution-to-public.html>

<sup>78</sup> - [www.gafspfund.org/gafsp/node/737](http://www.gafspfund.org/gafsp/node/737)



173. Regionalisation of support to ARD in SSA has added to the risks and the negative outcomes of competitive funds. It has encouraged a ‘supply-driven’ form of competition, especially by allowing international and regional organisations to bid for support from funds managed by other international and regional organisations. These supra-national providers have better skills, more resources and a broader mandates than national institutions, so they are better able to compete. Even if they do bring in national partners, they do not necessarily have a commitment to building country capacity and the same priorities. Together these factors risk, often a creeping, distortion of resources, equality of competition and the research agenda away from the national ARD users and providers.

174. Competitive grant funding has also added an extra layer of ARD infrastructure and management overhead costs and success depends the quality of fund management. A technically and administratively able manager justifies the additional costs through the quality of the fund’s direction, and the rigour with which it manages researcher performance. It is beyond the scope of this Study to judge the quality of the many different funds.

175. This assessment is not one-sided as at least one example from Phase 1, the SSA CP which is managed by FARA’s, appears to provide effective management of this risk and may provide lessons for improved management of donor support. Significantly this involves a regional organisation managing ‘donor-originating CGIAR funds’ and high levels of national ‘buy-in’.

176. The Study briefly reviewed CORAF’s call procedures which indicate a good technical management standard. At the national level, CIRAD reports that the Benin ARD competitive funding mechanism is having a positive effect, exploiting the benefits of competition, but within national ring-fencing of funds (see para. 57). The Tanzania evaluation of ASDP was less positive about the zonal research funds. The number of research projects had increased, but they were largely researcher-led, under-funded and too short-term to have significant impact.

#### **5.2.5. Access to and sharing and communication of information/ knowledge**

177. Phase 1 identified the poor quality of current databases on donor support to SSA ARD as a constraint to better coordination and harmonisation through CAADP. The Study has found it extremely difficult to accurately map donor support as it flows through a large, complex and overlapping network of funding channels and modalities. In Phase 2, further examples were found where better, more transparent information would greatly improve communication and understanding. For example, there is almost no information available on the MDTFs managed by the World Bank. More data on the websites of CAADP-related agencies would be also useful. Taking Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the Study together three points can be made on this topic:

- The poor and inconsistent standards of public domain (i.e. web-based) information on CAADP Pillars 1, 2 and 3 made it impossible to compare progress on these three pillars with that made on Pillar 4, as is sought in the Study’s ToR.
- The DIE study and the CAADP review both emphasise the need for a stronger and more effective CAADP communication strategy. This Study’s SSQ responses confirms that finding and supports the need to address this as a priority.
- Partly due to the lack of information flow there is an apparent lack of inter-pillar working, something that should be fundamental to CAADP and the agricultural development needs of SSA. This is especially important for Pillar 4, which is intended to be cross-cutting to the other pillars.

### **5.3. A Standard Agricultural Development Strategy**

178. The case studies have described how most CAADP stocktaking and analysis has been based on ReSAKSS/IFPRI models, used to derive target levels of agricultural growth and sector investment requirements to meet the Millennium Development Goal for poverty reduction. These quite sophisticated models take account of differences between one country’s economy and another, of the way production is distributed between different agricultural sectors, and of the balance between



agriculture and other parts of the economy. Nevertheless, the underlying strategy is common: economic growth led by agriculture and agricultural growth led by yield improvement. Other possibilities, for example that agriculture will be a lagging sector, which contributes to growth by reducing costs and raising labour productivity more than it does by raising output, are not considered. Serious questions about the efficiency of public spending on agriculture and the affordability of the proposed levels of investment are not adequately considered.

179. For CAADP to address these questions, it would need to make a much more intensive engagement with each partner country. Early plans for CAADP support included a network of ReSAKSS national nodes but these have not been realised. Most SSA countries already have a relatively strong base of policy analysis and research; a base which has been built up over a decade or more of work with the World Bank and other donors. To help a country to develop and improve from that base, CAADP will need to bring significantly greater technical and financial resources to the task, in the framework of a long-term commitment: five years perhaps.

180. Improving the quality of donor support to ARD also requires greater effort in-country. Efforts to stimulate research led by demand from smallholder farmers were, perhaps, always optimistic. Nevertheless, there can be no question that close, sustained engagement with farmers is the only way researchers can judge the likely relevance of their work. Funding research through relatively short-term grants from international and regional competitive funds makes the needed quality and continuity of that engagement difficult to achieve, especially where those funds' primary objectives are regional.

181. The Study team have suggested that yield improvement is not necessarily as critical as current strategies assume. Relatedly, IFPRI have pointed out that agricultural productivity in many African countries is well below what can be achieved using “*existing technologies and farmer best practices.*” This indicates that research into why farmers do not use existing technologies and practices, and into ways to help them upgrade may be more valuable than research to identify completely new technologies. Both of these are questions that can only be effectively answered at the farmer level.

182. This alternate approach requires an effective research/ extension/ development continuum to provide the needed ‘uptake promotion and scaling-up’. These functions are best carried out within a national context as a priority with appropriate regional support and linkages. The Study’s primary evidence is insufficient to determine whether the current national systems are adequate to ensure this continuum. However, secondary information (e.g. from ASTI) on the degraded ARD capacity suggests they are not. This further supports the suggestion that greater engagement at the country-level, and a focus on building in-country capacity, is needed within donor support.

#### **5.4. Strengths and Weaknesses in Donor Support to ARD in SSA**

183. Since the beginning of the millennium, donors have developed relatively standard approaches to working with SSA governments. Development partner groups and sector working groups have improved donor coordination, as has the introduction of Joint Assistance Strategies. Donor support is now better aligned behind Poverty Reduction Strategies and related sector strategies; especially where it is managed through basket funds/Sector Wide Approaches. It seems less certain that this has done much to increase the sense of national Ownership. Where donors meet together monthly in sector working groups, they may only meet Government as a group two times a year.

184. Although these developments were largely complete before CAADP got underway, it has supported them. In most countries CAADP has managed to link its work with existing coordination platforms and been recognised as part of the system. However, reports and Study evidence (see Section 4.2) suggest that it has fallen some way short of its potential, especially with respect to Ownership. It might have been expected that CAADP, as the ‘Africa –owned and –led initiative’ would have most to contribute in this key area; one in which it would appear that there is most need for improvement.

185. The data limitations of this short desk study must be emphasised again. That said, on the evidence available to this Study, ARD is not an area which has benefited from the new structures for





coordination and harmonisation. There are two reasons for this. First, at the national level, the move to sector wide/budget support coincided with the end of large programmes of support to NARS. The result was that ARD lost visibility in national programmes, just at a time when it was struggling to absorb complex reforms to introduce demand-led research and private sector participation.

186. The other factor was international. Unlike other sectors, ARD for developing countries has always had an international constituency. In the 1960s, this was a small group of CGIAR centres and research institutes in developed countries. This has expanded to include more CGIAR centres, the SROs and other African organisations like FARA, AGRA and AATF. Donor support channelled through these intermediary organisations has expanded substantially, just as direct support to national systems has shrunk. Funding through these supra-national channels is not well-integrated into donor coordination structures or Government systems at the country level. This is one of the most significant weaknesses the Study has identified. It is one to which CAADP may have contributed, through its focus on continental and regional organisations.

187. These factors have may have led to a major imbalance in donor support to ARD. Research into global and regional public goods, many of them in the realm of higher science, are now extremely well funded. National public goods such as demand-led, farming-system specific, adaptive research are under-funded. If a national institution can get funding, it is often short-term, it comes through regional channels, and it is tied to the objectives of the regional or international fund which provides it. This imbalance is most acutely seen in a lack of national capacity.

188. For CAADP itself, the most significant weaknesses are clearly identified in its own review report:

- There is “*a surprising lack of vision of how [CAADP’s] medium-term objectives will be met beyond implementing the roundtable process and the signing of compacts;*” and
- “*CAADP has not shown whether the level of investments that have been estimated as being needed to transform African agriculture could be absorbed.*”

189. CAADP has great strengths. It has won unanimous support from international donors and built a strong African and sub-regional framework for its work. African nations have yet to take full ownership of the CAADP process, but they have acknowledged its legitimacy and the role it is playing. Its willingness to carry out and publish critical reports about its own performance are another strength. To sum up, it is sufficient to repeat the conclusion of earlier reviews: that CAADP has very important potential. It is now time to realise it. This Study’s purpose is to suggest how this might be done with an emphasis on the role of donors and specifically EIARD. The ideas to do this are set out in the last section of the report.



## 6. Opportunities to Improve the Coordination of Donor Support to ARD

190. The Study identifies three major opportunities for CAADP. One relates to Pillar 4, as in the Study ToR, and two are broader. As is to be expected, they spring from the weaknesses just identified. Some opportunities for other stakeholders are also identified. The final subsection summarises the Study's suggestions for EIARD to contribute to these opportunities based on the findings of Phase 1 and 2.

### 6.1. Coordination of Donor Support to ARD

191. The Study has identified a potential imbalance in donor support to SSA ARD. Programmes channelled through international and regional agencies are being given priority while direct support to research in-country has been reduced. If correct, this may be a major weakness in delivering CAADP's agricultural development objectives. An effective national ARD system is an essential part of the continuum needed to deliver development outcomes from agricultural research. It is stressed that this is not intended to suggest that international and regional ARD institutions do not have a role. It is the distribution of support between the different levels that is the concern.

192. There is a major opportunity for CAADP, and for FARA in particular to work to redress this imbalance. It needs to be done urgently, against clear priorities and to achieve a critical mass of effort. An outline approach would build on work already done by ASTI on current national capacities. It would seek to work with and support national stakeholders to prepare a national agricultural research for development strategy for inclusion in each country's Agriculture Investment Plan. For each country this exercise would need to be well resourced and have the technical capacity to be completely rigorous. It will be particularly important to take account of lessons from earlier, unsuccessful efforts, and avoid investments in expensive, unsustainable infrastructure and institutional structures. A strong orientation towards development outcomes, as opposed to pure research, will be essential. An approach driven by a theoretical target of say 1.5% of agricultural GDP for research must be avoided.

193. The Study team are very aware of the risk that this effort will merely duplicate previous efforts to strengthen the NARS. It is clear that reduced support to the national systems partly reflects donor disappointment with the results from earlier programmes. Tanzania, for example, has benefited from two successive Agricultural Research Projects. Between the World Bank and other donors, the second of these provided some \$45 million of support. Yet the final Project Performance Assessment Report rated the project 'Moderately Unsatisfactory' on all aspects, with a high 'Risk to Development Outcome' i.e. a likelihood that the results would not be sustainable.<sup>79</sup> The unavoidable fact remains, that CAADP cannot achieve its Pillar 4 objectives in a country if the NARS is ineffective.

194. At the same time, CAADP should look for ways to engage forcefully in the current CGIAR reform process, with a specific brief to represent the African NARS and help ensure that their strategies and capacities and their client farmers' needs are adequately reflected in the CGIAR research agenda. Both FARA and the SROs should be asked to review: firstly how their current support contributes to national ARD capacity, and matches national needs and policies, on a country-by-country basis; secondly, how the services they provide make a distinctive contribution to simplifying CAADP's institutional arrangements and to reducing transaction costs for member countries.

195. A broader analysis might also be needed to determine what is the optimum balance between global, regional and national research in Africa. While not an evaluation, this would assess the current status of the CGIAR and SRO programmes and the extent to which they are contributing to improvements in productivity at the national level: the focus for CAADP's efforts. This assessment would also look at the extent to which the NARS involvement in international and regional programmes means that they are working on international, regional public goods rather than on

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<sup>79</sup> World Bank Report 40109-TZ, June 2007, Project Performance Assessment Report and [Agricultural] Sector Overview



national research priorities and are able to contribute to the national agricultural development effort. Other issues worth investigating include a cost:benefit analysis of competitive grant funds at international, regional and national levels, and the possibility that networked projects, like the Pan African Bean Research Alliance are more effective than the regional centres of excellence to support the delivery of development outcomes from ARD.

196. The third element to this opportunity comes through CAADP's ability to address donors on behalf of the African nations it represents. This Study has identified some potential issues. If they are confirmed, and if CAADP, EIARD and other stakeholders agree that they need to be addressed, CAADP is the organisation which has the clear mandate to present those issues in the CAADP Partnership Platform, GCARD other fora.

## **6.2. Building Country Ownership**

197. For CAADP, but also for other donor coordination platforms, Ownership remains the biggest challenge. This partly reflects disagreements between the donors and national stakeholders, and partly the fact that budget and staff shortages may make it difficult for the national side to take ownership, even where it wants to. As a wholly African initiative, CAADP is the natural vehicle to tackle these issues in the agriculture sector. At present, the only permanent CAADP presence in a country is provided by FAO, usually one person, backed up by ReSAKSS/IFPRI on missions and studies. A larger, more focussed and wholly CAADP effort would be needed, perhaps one embedded in a national institution as has been recommended by the reviews of CAADP. Whatever the means, the opportunity is clear. So is the need.

198. The aim of such an effort would be to provide the Ministry of Agriculture and other national stakeholders with a sounding board with which to discuss strategic issues and differences of opinion with donors. It would also provide national stakeholders with additional policy analysis and specialist advice, to help balance the technical forces in discussions with the donors, individually or as a group.

199. Reviews of donor coordination efforts in-country have suggested that they are also under-resourced. Without an established secretariat and with rapid turnover among donor representatives, the coordination and sector working groups do not always provide national stakeholders the continuity of engagement and purpose that they need and deserve. A national CAADP facility would need to avoid co-option from the donor side, but it could help the national side to press the donors to provide a more stable and helpful joint position.

## **6.3. The Post Compact Process**

200. The Study has found, like other reviews, that CAADP may have underestimated the in-country effort required during the Post Compact period and therefore the level and continuity of support needed. It may also have underestimated the complexity of the exercise. It is not just a matter of preparing, and seeking funding for an outline Agriculture Investment Plan. Instead, it is necessary to work out how such a plan will fit in with existing national plans and programmes, to analyse in detail what national resources are available, and to test the feasibility of the individual projects. The opportunity is to commit the resources needed to do this, at a level of analysis which is at least equal to that found in earlier plans such as Tanzania's ASDS\ASDP. The need for such an initiative is demonstrated by Benin's failure to win funding from GAFSP.

## **6.4. Other Opportunities**

201. Significant efforts have been put into donor coordination at the international level. MDTFs have provided unified channels for funding, and a number of different technical and consultation platforms have been created. It is outside the scope of this Study, but the team notes two points. First, there is an impression of fund proliferation and platform proliferation. Second, there does not seem to be a strong link between this global coordination effort and donor coordination platforms in-country. As with CAADP and ARD, there is a question of balance. Studies suggest in-country coordination frameworks lack the resources and continuity needed to be fully effective, while global



efforts are well funded and backed by dedicated secretariats in the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development and other organisations. If these impressions were to be confirmed, it would be worth investigating ways to re-balance these arrangements.

202. Much more important than that, however, is the opportunity for donors and other international stakeholders to support CAADP in the effort to realise its full potential. None of the reviews, and certainly not this Study, question the concept or the fact that CAADP's country focus is correct. Support to making that focus even stronger would contribute directly to greater aid coordination, harmonisation and, above all, ownership.

203. In both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the study, data quality and availability, communication and transparency have been key issues. The Study's best efforts have failed to develop an accurate mapping of donor support to ARD, either globally or at the level of single countries. Provided it can be created on a single, unified platform and provided it has the support of at least a large majority of donors, the opportunity exists to provide a database of donor support to SSA ARD. This would be an important service and substantially advance understanding of donor efforts to support ARD in SSA.

204. More generally improved information, and its availability and transparency, is critical to allow for 'lesson learning' and capacity development as well as to improve accountability from both donors and beneficiaries. This latter point is particularly important if the CAADP is to be given the opportunity to realise its potential since CAADP process and procedures will need to be the default through which donor support is transacted.

## **6.5. Opportunities and Implications for EIARD**

205. This subsection summarises the Study's findings and their associated opportunities and implications for EIARD (including those identified above) which apply generically to all donors supporting ARD in SSA. This summary is structured around the Study's terms of reference and integrates the findings from both Study phases.

206. For all opportunities identified here EIARD has a comparative advantage to act based on the large number of member countries, the extent of the EU and EIARD collective support (bi- and multi-lateral) to SSA ARD and its coverage in terms of subjects and countries.

### ***Information***

207. The problems in both Study phases of obtaining information; primarily on donors' ARD support programmes and projects in Phase 1, and in responses to Study SSQ in Phase 2 are well documented in the report. While this has been a disappointing constraint to Study delivery enough information has been available to support cautious conclusions and suggestions.

208. The Study considers high levels of transparency, availability and access and information are fundamental to improved coordination and governance of support to SSA ARD and the agriculture sector. Phase 1 suggested that much could be done to improve the current information-base on donor support to ARD with modest resources assuming donors have the will to act. In response to the Phase 1 report EIARD has acted to scope this opportunity. The results of this scoping study are not available. However, when they are, and assuming the potential identified in Phase 1 is confirmed, the question is whether EIARD thinks it worthwhile to act.

### ***Partnership Programmes***

209. There is a strong linkage between the Phase 1 finding of the substantial resources allocated by EIARD donors to 'Partnership Programmes' (PP) across the SSA in a range of countries, and the expressed need (in response to the Study's SSQ) for increased capacity development at national level in support of CAADP and ARD. There is an opportunity for EIARD to rationalise, coordinate and align its current PP against an explicit CAADP-related/ supportive capacity building programme focussing on national ARD capacity. This could make an important contribution to the suggested rebalancing of support to national ARD systems, and, consequently, to the sustainability of CAADP delivery.



### ***Emerging Donors***

210. Phase 1 identified the BMGF as the most important emerging donor to SSA ARD and particularly to CAADP oriented ARD, particularly through its support of regional agencies, especially AGRA but also AATF. Phase 2 confirms this finding.

211. AGRA and AATF already have strong linkages to CAADP at the regional level. Here the opportunity for EIARD is to use its members' SSA country representatives to bring these agencies into the existing ASWG system as part of a wider effort to upgrade ASWGs to provide governments with a much improved partnership service and support and reduce fracturing in-country donor coordination mechanisms and processes. Consistent with the Study's central finding, an important, even dominant, theme for the ASWGs should be the rebalancing of support to national ARD systems from donor and national sources to ensure their adequate and sustained capacity.

### ***CGIAR reform***

212. Phase 2 has not contradicted the Phase 1 judgement that the CGIAR reform does not seem to be strongly oriented towards addressing the CAADP agenda. Conversely, CAADP should have a stronger role in setting the CGIAR agenda. The need for better coordination between CGIAR and SRO programmes was a specific response to the SSQ consultation and the Study suggests that CGIAR's coordination and alignment with national systems may also need to be examined. As representative of major, and influential CGIAR stakeholders, EIARD would be in a position to use its collective leverage to support this effort.

### ***Aid Effectiveness***

213. The Study's primary evidence on Aid Effectiveness in support to ARD is mixed and weakened by the limited response to the SSQ. However, its findings are in line with the wider evidence which suggests progress is patchy and generally poor. By design CAADP should be a Paris Declaration-friendly, if not compliant, initiative and it is largely the responsibility of donors to make it so. Thus, in addition to that included under the 'opportunities for EIARD' identified above, any stronger engagement with CAADP by EIARD should constitute genuine and improved progress towards achieving Paris Declaration principles.

### ***Study Method***

214. The Study's limited time and resources constrain what it could be expected to achieve. An additional constraint was the poor response to the Study SSQ, although this was offset to some extent by the quality of the individual responses. The non-EIARD stakeholders' lack of response is the more understandable. It was probably due to a number of factors, among them EIARD's low profile for outsiders. Email comments with returned SSQs responses suggests that respondents' reluctance to contribute reflects a lack of faith that such studies' and their reports are unlikely to make any difference, even if they are made publicly available.

215. More disappointing was the lack of response by some EIARD members (e.g. France) who potentially had an important contribution to make to the Study and so to EIARD impact. The Study has no insight to why this should be and suggests that the reasons should be discussed by an EIARD meeting. Whatever the factors involved this lack of ability to share experience and ideas only serves to reinforce the fundamental importance of the availability and access to information if lessons are to be learnt and widely applied.

### ***Coordination and Harmonisation***

216. The Study's central finding is that donor support to ARD across the international, regional and national levels has got out of balance and support to national level is now inadequate. This has led to degraded capacity and capability at the national level which jeopardises the CAADP initiative. The logic of this finding is that there is a large and urgent need to rebalance current donor support to SSA ARD in favour of national systems.

217. The Study's purpose is "to provide EIARD with the knowledge and processes required to better coordinate and harmonise support to CAADP Pillar 4 both between EIARD members, and between EIARD members and other donors". Given the Study's resources this was always an ambitious



assignment. The summary above demonstrates the extent to which the Study has been able to contribute to this purpose by identifying opportunities for action for improved support to ARD. In terms of the coordination and harmonisation of this support the Study may appear to have been less successful.

218. This assessment may, however, be premature. It is for the EIARD to decide whether the Study's interpretation of its evidence, its diagnosis and suggested remedy is valid. If it is judged these are, and EIARD is willing to redress this balance, then by providing a common and valuable purpose and means for EIARD to organise its support to CAADP Pillar 4 around, the Study may yet achieve its purpose. The EIARD has considerable comparative advantage to act. Not only in terms of its financial resources and influence and current ARD support initiatives, but more importantly in the knowledge and experience its members bring to the challenge. It is for EIARD to decide whether this challenge is met.